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Even,  
What has been, that will be; what has been done, that will be done.  
Nothing is new under the sun!  
Ecclesiastes 1, 9
2
 
There may be other knowledges to acquire, other questions to consider, 
starting, not from that what others have known,  
but from what they have ignored  
MOSCOVICI
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 USCCB (2011). The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). Retrieved from 
http://www.usccb.org/bible/ecclesiastes/1, checked on April 3, 2017. 
3
 Our translation for: “Puede que actualmente haya otros conocimientos que adquirir, otras cuestiones 
que plantearse, partiendo, no de lo que los demás han conocido, sino de lo que han ignorado”. S. 
MOSCOVICI. Quoted by MORIN, E. 1986: 20. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Even when, “nothing is new under the sun” (Eccl. 1, 9) “There may be other 
knowledges to acquire, other questions to consider, starting, not from that what others 
have known, but from what they have ignored” (MOSCOVICI)4 by choice or by 
chance, that is not relevant, the question is thinking about something un-thought at the 
moment. That is the hazardous passion developed here and you are invited to share it.      
 
 NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK is the result of years of reflection. Some time ago, working in 
commodities we could feel how difficult it was to decide the order of the arguments 
used during the negotiation process. As in a Bridge game, we translated the arguments 
according to the rules of Bridge and saw how it worked to deal with them as in a Bridge 
hand, playing them and seeing what would happen. The results were impressive. We 
were thrilled about the potential for improvement on the negotiation process. We 
decided to investigate deeper on the possibility to undertake negotiations applying 
Bridge rules to organize the order of arguments. This was the subject of a previous 
paper (2011): The BRIDGE. A bridge TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS
5
. It was the first 
formal attempt to establish a protocol to know the best order to use the arguments 
during the negotiation process, by converting them into cards and play a Bridge hand. 
However, as will be shown later, the study revealed some limitations. This subsequent 
work is an attempt to reduce these limitations. 
 The new work should be more scientific and precise, so the decision was taken 
to start a PhD in Logic as the best framework and tool to develop a research on this 
subject. Following this path, the idea of turning arguments into cards to play a Bridge 
hand expanded progressively and went one step ahead just exploring: players, cards, 
                                                          
4
 Our translation for: “Puede que actualmente haya otros conocimientos que adquirir, otras cuestiones 
que plantearse, partiendo, no de lo que los demás han conocido, sino de lo que han ignorado”. S. 
MOSCOVICI (see footnote 3). 
5
 MARTÍNEZ, M.D. (2011). Master’s thesis available at the Library of Economics, Social, Political and 
Communication Sciences (BSPO) at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). 
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deals and the information hidden in the player’s announcements and in the cards and/or 
in the deals. This new angle brought the research to the neurolinguistics patterns –NLP- 
and cryptic languages, like Russian Cards (van DITMARSCH, 2008).  
 Finally this PhD thesis is an attempt to think how to create logical dialogues to 
tackle negotiations, meaning: solving conflicts from basic linguistic structures 
(conjunctions; disjunctions; conditionals) placed under a dialogue form as a cognitive 
system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there is a permanent feed-back 
between both. 
 This paper aims to show and to share just a path, not a conquered territory, to 
negotiate in a dialogical framework and remain always open to any possible 
improvement. It will be like a ‘tragedy’ in three ‘acts’. Each ‘Act’ will be a ‘conceptual 
mimesis’ of the arguments used during the negotiation process to produce a ‘catharsis’, 
an improvement on the negotiation process. The three ‘acts’ have a spiral form, the first 
one is the Bridge, the second the Neuro-Linguistic Patterns (hereunder, NLP) and the 
third is the cryptic language Russian Cards. Therefore, the procedure of this thesis will 
be to study each part in accordance with its contribution and its limitations. Step by step 
our task will be to address ourselves to the limitations with the aim to reduce of them. 
Conclusions will be just to show a possible map, a guide to choose the order of 
arguments in negotiations.  
 
 The structure of each ‘Act’, as a step of this path, will be: 
 1.  A presentation on the appropriateness and accommodation of the specific 
subject in the whole of the research. 
 2.  Application to prepare negotiations. 
 3.  Lights and shadows, or some interesting considerations to keep in mind for   
  planning negotiations.  
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 The case chosen for study as a model for this ‘experiment’ is the 1st Camp David 
Accords.6 And exhaustive and aseptic analysis of these Accords can be found in the 
annex in order to have available the experimental frame
7
. In order to preserve the rigour 
and the aseptic nature of this research we do not apply any framework that will be 
applied later, so you will not find any application of the Game Theory, neither NLP nor 
dialogical semantics used across this analysis of the 1
st
 Camp David Accords. 
Preliminary research work was done on this negotiation as mentioned above. The same 
subject was chosen to give continuity to the started investigation. That was the reason, 
and not the idea that this theory is only applicable to international negotiations. This 
theory is for negotiations, whatever they are. 
 
 The methodology has been the one that is appropriate in Logic: many paper 
reflections, thought drafts, therefore not included here because as drafts they do not 
have a decisive character for the final thesis; specific sources
8
 such as: manuals, books, 
articles and documents about the different subjects tackled along of this paper; and 
personal reflection comparing the distinct results and information. The purpose of 
working with specific sources has been to be as rigorous as possible while opening a 
new theoretical way into negotiation analysis and also into applied logic. One of the 
difficulties of opening a new way, no matter how fascinating it may be, is that no 
sources exist while it is being built. As you know, the instrumental nature of logic was 
recognised as early as the Organon by Aristotle. In fact, logic has been a tool for 
philosophical studies since Aristotle, even when many logicians see logic only as a 
family of formal systems. Logic is not applied to philosophical problems as an engineer 
                                                          
6
 A published presentation by MARTÍNEZ, M.D. (2012) is also available about this subject. 
7
 To judge our success in establishing a protocol to know the best order in which to use the arguments 
during the negotiation process, we needed a ‘territory’ where our conclusions could be verified. It is why 
we chose a completed negotiation case to guarantee an objective application, because there is no 
possibility to change the events. Without this document in the annex it would be quite difficult to assess 
this research in terms of right or wrong, because the ‘semantical true’ would be unknown. 
8
 Note that in this thesis there are two sections named Bibliography: one at the end of the ‘general’ part 
and another attached to the annex. There you can find specific references together with other apparently 
‘repeated’, these ones are shared sources for both research approaches. 
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may apply some techniques. Nevertheless, many logical notions transcend the particular 
formal systems and logic can offer there a rigorous language -with precise meanings- to 
study philosophical discourses and discourses in social and human sciences. Moreover, 
it is a great help for enhancing precision in communications. So, modern logic deals 
with a wide range of intelligent interactions across academic disciplines: from 
humanities to natural sciences. This dynamic turn involves the logical dynamics 
(dialogues as a form of reasoning; dialogical logic; study of knowledge; communication 
process; etc.). In this sense, van Benthen was clever saying: 
Logical dynamics is a way of doing logic, but is also a general 
stance. Making actions, events, and procedures first-class 
citizens enriches the ways in which logic interacts with 
philosophy, and it provides a fresh look at many traditional 
themes. Looking at logic and philosophy over the last century, 
key topics like quantification, knowledge, or conditionality have 
had a natural evolution that went back and forth across 
disciplines. They often moved from philosophy to linguistics, 
mathematics, computer science, or economics (…). (van 
BENTHEN, J., 2011: 268). 
 Thus, there is an arsenal of fields to apply logic. Thank you for your 
understanding along this path of applied logic on a new field: negotiations.  
 Therefore, this work consists of a creative and an innovative effort full of risks. 
The experiment will confirm whether that innovation and risk were worthy and the 
reader will judge on the degree of accommodation.  
 
 In the following pages you will discover a new opportunity to apply the logical 
dialogues to deal with negotiations, to solve conflicts (as objective application) and 
even to serve peace (as a subjective option, since tools do not have an ethical value in 
themselves). 
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 As has been said before, this paper is the continuation of a previous one -The 
BRIDGE. A bridge TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS (MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011)-. Thus, the 
next pages will be a sort of summary of the above, in order to enable a right support for 
the present reflection. We will take out the most relevant data for our present research. 
Anyhow, the complete text is always available to be consulted at the Library of 
Economics, Social, Political and Communication Sciences (BSPO) at the Catholic 
University of Louvain (UCL). 
 
 When we dealt with the research about Bridge and negotiations in the past, we 
conceived it as a double spiral, like DNA and Bridge as its linkage. One spiral was the 
‘scaffold’, named so because it is the theoretical negotiation axis that supports a 
possible rational explanation about the implementation of negotiations. Consequently, 
the natural limit of our ‘scaffold’ was its implementation (once the theory is 
implemented we do not have any possibility of changing the events): the ‘scaffolding’, 
the other spiral, which supports the negotiation in itself. Both spirals are simultaneous 
and intertwined. As a consequence, they cannot be understood separately and they exist 
always together –they are the two sides of the same coin–. 
 
 The way used to analyse the ‘scaffold’ was theoretical-deductive (we started 
from theory to achieve a practical application). All negotiations start with a decision, the 
decision of negotiating about something, thus Chapter 1 was an analysis of the Decision 
Theory. However, this analysis was necessary but not sufficient because we needed our 
decision to be rational and therefore we showed that the most rational decision would be 
the intersection point between the ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. As satisfaction 
cannot be objectively calculated (the level of satisfaction is always subjective), the 
rationality of the decision remains on the side of the objectivity, that is, in optimization. 
In games both are mixed, the result of a game speaks about its optimization and the 
player himself speaks about his satisfaction. Therefore, our second step was the analysis 
of this rationality by means of Game Theory –Chapter 2–. Once we completed the 
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ground of a negotiation, which includes the decision of negotiating something and its 
rational ground, we were ready to analyse the negotiation as a theoretical approach. The 
intended purpose of this analysis was to answer the implicit question in this chapter: ‘Is 
the Game Theory useful to make rational decisions in negotiations?’ –Chapter 3–. Up to 
now we have been building the foundations (i.e. the first three steps of our spiral) and 
we concluded that the rationality of decision-making in the course of a negotiation can 
be addressed by the rational study of the ‘game’ that represents the negotiation. But, 
'what ‘game’ in particular will be studied? and ‘why are we choosing one ‘game’ and 
not another?’ This was the content of our next chapter, where we dealt with the fourth 
and last step of our ‘scaffold’ –Chapter 4–. That was the time to answer the question: ‘Is 
the Bridge a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations?’  
 From this ‘scaffold’ we recover Chapter 4, turned here into Chapter 1.1: The 
Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? The 
aim of this chapter is reduced to know and understand the rationality that is implicit in 
Bridge -and not to become expert Bridge players-. So the length and depth of this 
chapter is restricted according to our goal.  
 
 For the other spiral, ‘scaffolding’, the procedure toward knowledge was 
empirical-inductive (we start from a specific case and we reach a feasible theory). So 
we tackled this practical spiral from a case study: the 1
st
 Camp David Accords. This was 
a longer, dense, comprehensive chapter that was analysed in the most sceptical way. 
Our goal was to know whether or not Bridge was a possible internal bridge (‘linkage’) 
between the theoretical framework (‘scaffold’) and the practical cases (‘scaffoldings’). 
In order to accomplish that, we needed to study a past case (future cases cannot possibly 
prove a hypothesis) and analyse it following an approach not based on the Game 
Theory. It was done so because we suspected that Bridge was our ‘linkage’ and we 
could have matched up our hypothesis with our analysed case in Game Theory. If we 
did that, then the degree of accommodation between the two spirals could have been 
conditioned.  
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 You will find in the annex the study case (‘scaffolding’): 1st Camp David 
Accords. 
 
 Then we had the two spirals defined and we could ask about the possible 
element of ‘linkage’ between both. The element proposed as bridge was the Bridge 
game. Thus, this part was an application of the Bridge game to a case of negotiation. 
We chose to apply Bridge to the 1
st
 Camp David Accords. With this application we 
made possible to verify whether the Bridge was a feasible bridge in the analysis of 
negotiations. In other words, we wanted to confirm that Bridge could be a possible 
bridge between the two spirals. So, this section was an application of the former 
Chapter 4 (present Chapter 1.1). Our implicit questions were: ‘Is the Bridge game the 
element which bridges both spirals in the specific case of negotiations?’ ‘Could it be a 
tool for a rational analysis of negotiations?’ In order to answer these questions we 
proposed the application a Bridge game to the previous study case –1st Camp David 
Accords-. 
 We recover here this study of the ‘spirals linkage’ as Chapter 1.2: Bridge 
application to the 1
st
 Camp David Accords.  
 
 Finally, the conclusion was a reflection about the following: ‘To what extent is it 
possible to consider Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of negotiations?’ 
‘What light does it provide to our understanding of negotiations?’ ‘Which are its 
limitations?’ ‘How could we overcome these limitations?’  
 We bring up these reflections here, turned into Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. A 
bridge toward negotiations. Lights and Shadows. This chapter will not be a duplicate of 
the former ‘Conclusion’. We expect to have ‘improved’ something during this second 
look at the subject. Anyway, the ‘improvement’, in the case there is some, will be 
clarified through the pages of this research. At the end of this chapter the great shadow 
will be suggested, where we would like to throw some light along this paper. 
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 In this way, our Act I, composed by three chapters, will be the path to discover 
why the Bridge game is useful to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations 
and where its limitations are. 
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Chapter 1.1: The Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in the 
world of negotiations? [This chapter is taken from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 28-35. 
You will find in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text.]  
 We suggest studying the Bridge game because we believe that it is the best to 
make rational decision in the world of negotiations ‘Why do we believe that?’ Because 
the Game Theory is based on the analysis of the microcosm of games and the Bridge is 
a communication strategic game
9
, then, it could be probable the best refection of a 
negotiation. In order to answer this question it will necessary to analyse the Bridge, 
following a step by step process, so we can prove the Bridge is a game useful to make 
rational decisions and more specifically, it is the best illustration about what happen in a 
negotiation. To do, we will answer three questions: ‘What is its ontology?’; ‘What is its 
epistemology?’ and ‘How can we say that the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory?’ 
 
The Bridge ontology 
 Before starting with the analysis of the Bridge ontology we need to define the 
concept of ‘ontology’. Ontology is “a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature 
and relations of being.”10 But, in the case of the Bridge game ‘which will be the nature 
and relations of its being in itself?’ To answer this question we will use a much modern 
definition of ‘ontology’: “an explicit specification of a conceptualization”11 Therefore, 
we need to describe the underlying conceptualization in the explicit Bridge 
specification.  
                                                          
9
 Cf. Robert Kast, opus cit., p. 11.  
10
 Definition of word ‘Ontology’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st meaning. Source online:  
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=ontology Authorized website of the Encyclopædia 
Britannica. 
11
 Thomas R. Gruber, “Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies used for Knowledge Sharing”. 
In: Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, by Nicola Guarino & 
Roberto Poli (eds.). Norwell (Massachusetts), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, Source online: 
http://itee.uq.edu.au/~infs3101/_Readings/OntoEng.pdf Authorized website of the School of Information 
Technology and Electrical Engineering at the University of Queensland (Australia). 
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 The explicit Bridge specification responds to its conceptualization. This is the 
relation by means of a pack of cards equally shared between all players. The nature of 
relations between beings (players) appears covered behind its conceptualization, the 
conceptualization of a common language between the players. Therefore, the ontology, 
which we are talking about, will be a ‘semantic ontology’ since “A semantic ontology is 
a conceptualization, common to a community of agents that understand natural 
language, of the categories and relations that pervade the agents’ environment as a 
whole. It can be used to specify the logical form as the truth-functional meaning of 
agent messages embedded in natural language. (…)”12 Then we will analyse the Bridge 
language to know its ontology, its being. 
 The Bridge language is common to its four players, but the players are divided 
into two pairs (named: North-South, the host pair, and East-West, the visiting pair). The 
relation between pairs is non-cooperative, but inside the pair the keep a cooperative 
relation. Through a conceptualized language, common to the community of players, the 
players reach an accord about which will be the trumps (not-trumps is other possibility 
of trumps). The game’s object is to reach the best communication possible between 
players of the same pair that use a common language, which is also kwon by the other 
pair. The objective is to reach the maximum of possible tricks from the probabilistic and 
combinatorial calculus. Apparently, the Bridge is a non-cooperative game in itself, but 
in the Bridge, the winner is the pair that in more turns has reached the 100% of the 
possible tricks, for that is strictly necessary a kind of ‘collaboration’ between the pairs. 
[In an ideal hand, which is quite habitual in Bridge], when a pair [proponent] obtains a 
trick of surplus is not because it has played very well, it is always because the other pair 
[opponents] has played wrongly; and when a pair [proponent] don’t obtains all the 
possible tricks is not because it has played wrong, it is always because the opponents 
                                                          
12
 Luc Schneider & Jim Cunningham, “Ontological Foundations of Natural Language. Communication 
in Multi-agent Systems”. In: Knowledge Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, by V. 
Palade, R. J. Howlett & L. Jain (eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003, Vol. 2773, p. 1403-
1410. Source online: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3373&representative 
Authorized website of the NEC Research Institute, Princeton (New Jersey), it is a scientific literature 
digital library and search engine that focuses primarily on the literature in computer and information 
science. 
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have played very well. Therefore, in the Bridge there is always an intrinsic collaboration 
process. Every obtained trick on top or below average will be a ‘gift’ (on top average) 
or a ‘lost’ (below average), but never the game in itself. To understand this apparent 
paradox it will be necessary to analyse the Bridge epistemology. 
 
The Bridge epistemology 
 We will start by offering a definition of 'epistemology’. Epistemology is “the 
study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to 
its limits and validity.”13 If the nature of the Bridge is founded on the mathematical 
principles, then in order to know the structure of Bridge it will be necessary to apply 
reasoning in accordance with mathematical logics’ principles, as ‘logic’ is “a science 
that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration: 
the science of the formal principles of reasoning.”14 Therefore, our mission will be to 
discover the logic that lies behind its ontology, as “(...) Formally, an ontology is the 
statement of a logical theory.”15 Therefore, our question shall be connected with the 
underlying Bridge logic. This logic will be founded on the probabilistic combinatorial 
mathematical principles.  
 […] the Bridge is played by four players, and as the pack of cards has 52 cards, 
and then each player will have 13 cards. This 13 cards are obtained by random 
distribution (C
13
52 C
13
39 C
13
26 = 52! / 13! 13! 13! 13!)
16
. This is the first step of the game 
and the only hazardous. From here, all the others steps will be an application, more or 
less correct [the correction degree only depends of the player qualities], of the 
                                                          
13
 Definition of word ‘Epistemology’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2nd meaning. Source online:  
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=epistemology Authorized website of the Encyclopædia 
Britannica. 
14
 Definition of word ‘Logic’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st a (1) meaning. Source online: 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=logic Authorized website of the Encyclopædia 
Britannica. 
15
 Thomas R. Gruber, opus cit. 
16
 Cf. Émile Borel & André Chéron, Théorie Mathématique du Bridge à la Portée de Tous. Paris, 
Éditions Jacques Gabay, 2009, p. 38.  
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probabilistic combinatorial mathematical principles. As the game implies to get the 
highest number of possible tricks, every time that a player plays a card, the others must 
play a card too. The played cards will be only those which fulfill the rules of the game: 
they must always play a card of the same suit. If they don't have any, then there are two 
possibilities: either they play trumps or they play other suit. The winner of the trick is 
the one who has played the highest of the played suit or who has played the highest of 
the trumps, if they are playing trumps. If they are playing not-trumps then, the winner 
trick will always be the highest of the played suit. We will have always the following 
situation: whoever starts the game will choose a card (C
1
13), and then the next players 
will have two possibilities:  
 1.  If they have cards in the played suit, then they will choose from those in the 
played suit (C
1
n=number of cards in the played suit). 
 2.  If they don’t have cards in the played suit, then they will choose from others 
cards. Again, there are two more possibilities: 
  2.1.  If we play at trumps: 
   2.1.1. Then we can play a trumps card (C
1
n=number of cards in trumps). 
   2.1.2. Then we can play a card of other suit (C
1
n=number of cards in other suit). 
  2.2.  If we play at not-trumps: always we have the possibility to play any 
   card (C
1
13). 
 Evidently, in every game, we have a smaller possibility (C
1
13-n [n=] number of played 
games, being n according to the chose case (case 1 or case 2 –2.1.1.; 2.1.2. or 2.2–). Therefore, in each trick we 
have less possibilities of ‘the possible’ cases. This makes very important the choice of 
the card to play, because once a card has been played, that card will not be available for 
the next game. This makes really important to choose the card which is in ‘perfect 
symmetry’. Any card has its value in itself, the value, is the same for each card and we 
need to know when to play them. This is the explanation of our paradox, this necessity 
of ‘perfect symmetry’ is the key to obtain the 100% of the possible tricks, and for that is 
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strictly necessary that each player plays the ‘symmetric’ card. Because of this we can 
say that the Bridge is a cooperative game but it is hidden behind a non-cooperative face. 
 Being the Bridge a game with such complexity: non-cooperative between the 
pairs, but at the same time cooperative between the pairs, ‘can we say that the Bridge 
belongs to the Game Theory?’ 
 
The Bridge belongs to the Game Theory? 
 According to the analysis [of the] […] Game Theory17, we can conclude that the 
Bridge belongs to the Game Theory. Then, it will be a game:                                      
non-cooperative/cooperative; two collective parties (two pairs) and one issue (the game 
in itself). The goal is to achieve a specific effect by applying one strategy, and this 
achievement will be founded on the probabilistic mathematical calculus. In the Bridge, 
the hazard is only present at the moment of the distribution of cards, but never during 
the development of the game. 
 In fact, the Bridge belongs to the category of the ‘ideal games’18, being the 
characteristics of these games: 
 “(1) Common knowledge.  There is full common knowledge of (a) the 
rationality of both players (whatever that turns out to mean), and (b) the strategy 
structure of the game for all players, and the preferences that each has with respect 
outcomes. 
 The force of this condition is that a player ‘i’ knows something that is relevant to 
a rational resolution of its decision problem, then any other player ‘j’ knows that player 
‘i’ has that knowledge. This is a typically taken to imply (among other things) that one 
player cannot have a conclusive reason, to which no other player has access, for 
                                                          
17
 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 20-24. 
18
  Cf. Edward F. McClennen, “Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games”. In: Knowledge, Belief 
and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 47-60. 
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choosing in a certain manner. That is, there are not hidden arguments for playing one 
way as opposed to another. 
 In addition, one invariably finds that the analysis proceeds by appeal to the 
following (at least partial) characterization of rational behaviour for the individual 
participant. 
 (2) Utility maximization. Each player’s preference ordering over the abstractly 
conceived space of outcomes and probability distributions over the events that condition 
such outcomes can be represented by utility function, unique up to positive affine 
transformations, that satisfies the expected-utility principle. 
 (3) Consequentialism. Choice among available strategies is strictly a function of 
the preferences the agent has with respect to the outcomes (or disjunctive set of 
outcomes) associated with each strategy. 
 Following Hammond (1988), condition (3) can be taken to imply that strategies 
are nothing more than neutral access routes to outcomes (or disjunctions of outcomes); 
the latter are what preferentially count for the agent. In particular, then, if two 
strategies yield exactly the same probabilities of the same outcomes occurring, then the 
agent will be indifferent between those strategies.”19 
 We can recognize the Bridge ontology and epistemology in these three 
characteristics of the ‘ideal games’. Therefore, we can assume the Bridge as belonging 
to the Game Theory. But then, ‘will it be a useful game to make rational decisions in the 
world of negotiations?’ 
 It should be noted that the term ‘common knowledge’ as is understood here, 
does not necessarily have the same meaning as it may have in the context of epistemic 
logic. 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Edward F. McClennen, opus cit., p. 47-48. 
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Is the Bridge a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? 
 Following […] [the] Decision Theory20, the more rational decision would be 
found in the intersection point between the ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. As the 
satisfaction cannot be objectively calculated (the level of satisfaction is always 
subjective) the rationality of the decision remains on the side of the objectivity, that is in 
the optimization, and as in the games both are mixed, and the result of a game speaks 
about its optimization, then the Game Theory will be useful to find the ‘intersection 
point’. Furthermore, in accord with […] [the] Negotiation Theory21, if the rationality of 
the decision-making, in the course of a negotiation, can be addressed by the rational 
study of the ‘game’ that represents the negotiation then we can state that the Bridge is a 
useful game to make rational decision in the world of negotiations.  
 At this point, it seems that our question is solved; but incisive minds [still] have 
another question: ‘Why have we chosen the Bridge as game to make rational decisions 
in the world of negotiations and not any other game?’ There are two answers, one more 
theoretical and the other one more connected with life. 
 From a theoretical point of view, the Bridge fulfils the characteristics for a game 
to make rational decision in the world of negotiations. It is a cooperative game with two 
parties and same issue, but at the same time, the Bridge is a non-cooperative game. In 
short, even if the ideal game to negotiate is a cooperative game (collaboration-
compromise), always the bargaining will be also a competition. In fact, in almost all 
negotiations, the real situation is a ‘bargaining mix’22; in the agreement there is a part 
fruit of the collaboration and another part fruit of the competition. In addition, the 
Bridge is a non-hazard game. It is a perfect mathematical symmetry; where the use of 
‘dialog’ intra-pair and inter-pairs is a ruled system where there is a constant 
maintenance of common knowledge
23
. Also, the fact that the winner is the pair that in 
                                                          
20
 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 15-19. 
21
 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 25-27. 
22
 Cf. R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 38. 
23
 Cf. R. Kiel & M. Schader, “Using Dialog-Controlled Rule Systems in a Maintenance Module for 
Knowledge Bases”. In: Annals of Operations Research, by Peter L. Hammer (ed.). Basel, J. C. Baltzer 
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more turns has reached the 100% of the possible tricks, that entails that the intersection 
point of optimization and satisfaction is really very near, it is nearly placed on top. 
 From other point of view, the Bridge includes the characteristics of the life itself. 
If we analyse each instant of our life, we could see that we always have a partner, even 
hidden, but that provides us with something which we have not but that we really need 
in that precise moment of our life. At the same time, there is always somebody, even 
hidden, who doesn’t want that we reach our goal. The elements that we have in favor or 
against our goal, they are the ‘life’s cards’, it will depend on the way we play them, that 
will achieve a higher, or lesser, degree of optimization and satisfaction in our own life. 
If we are strong in one of the elements, we will struggle to lean on it, and consequently 
will [propose to] play at ‘trumps’; if we are more or less strong in all the elements, we 
will try to lean on all, and then we shall play at ‘not-trumps’. 
 Therefore we have chosen the Bridge because we believe it is the best to make 
rational decisions in the world of negotiations and in the sphere of life. The ‘game of 
Life’: the art of ‘trading’ and ‘negotiating’ with Life at every moment of the life. And 
the Bridge is the best theoretical representation of the ‘game of Life’. [We will test it in 
the next chapter.] 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
AG, 1994, Vol. 52 (Decision Theory and Decision Systems by K. Mosler & M. Schader (eds.)), p. 171-
180. 
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Chapter 1.2: Bridge application to the 1
st
 Camp David Accords [This chapter is taken 
from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 71-81. You will find in square brackets the additions 
and/or alterations to the original text.]  
 
[Before starting this chapter, please allow us to create a scenario for the application] 
 Let us imagine that we are on August 1978. It is summer time, we are enjoying 
our holydays and the telephone rings. The prestigious editor in chief of a foreign affairs 
magazine –who knows our great love of the Bridge and our great interest [in] […] 
negotiations- proposes us the challenge of writing an article for his magazine. This 
article must be a prediction about what will happen, what will be the possible rational 
agreement at the next Camp David Accords (scheduled by the next month, September 
1978). But this article will have a condition: the prediction can only be based in a virtual 
Bridge game played among the leaders reunited at the summit (Begin, Sadat and 
Carter). And we, perhaps because of the heat’s drowsiness, perhaps because we are 
‘crazy’ who loves logical challenges, we do accept. (MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 70). 
 
[Remember that the objective information about what happened can be found in the 
annex document. This information will always be available to corroborate the Bridge 
application against our study case.] 
 
 The starting point for this chapter is two questions: ‘Is this Bridge game, the 
element that bridges both spirals in the specific case of […] negotiations?’ ‘Could it be 
a tool for a rational analysis of […] negotiations?’ To answer them, as we are 
proposing […] [during the introductory pages to this ‘Act’], we will apply a 
hypothetical game’s Bridge on the ‘future’ possible agreement at Camp David Accords. 
So, they game starts and our only available information is the available literature about 
the history between their relationships and their preparation for future meetings. Both, 
information and literature are very weak because at this time (this imaginary 
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game took place on August 1978) the Israeli Government didn’t allow to release to the 
general public the statistical abstract yearbook keeping it strictly confidential. This is 
the reason our data game cannot be founded on official sources. Therefore, this game 
will be based on our personal background on this matter. 
 
 A Bridge game starts with the identification of the two pairs: the North-South 
pair (host pair) and the East-West (the visiting pair). ‘Who is North-South, the host 
pair?’  The one who plays at home, in this case, Carter and Begin (Carter is the ‘Host’ 
because the negotiations will take place at the USA, and the USA is the ‘eternal’ ally of 
Israel). Then, ‘who is the East-West, the visiting pair?’ The visiting pair is Carter and 
Sadat (the alliance between USA and Egypt is really weak: in a historical perspective 
Egypt is a country under the USSR influence –we are still at the Cold War era–, and 
from the perspective of the interests, although they are not considerable, both the USA 
need guarantees for the Middle East raw materials and Egypt needs the financial aid 
from the USA).  
 Both pairs have now been identified. But, one of the players will play in both 
teams. ‘Is that possible?’ In our case, yes, because we have a player who has the aim in 
itself (the goal of these negotiations is to reach the peace in the Middle East, and who 
really wants it is the USA), but is not interested in the object of negotiation (the object 
is the condition to achieve this goal, in our case, the occupied territories during the ‘67 
War). Therefore, we are ‘luck’ and even our game will be more ‘simple’. As the game 
deals with the object in itself, and not about the objective, the goal is the consequence of 
game but not the game. Then, as the USA don’t take directly part on the object 
(necessary condition) and is the same player in the two ‘force lines’ (condition of 
sufficiency), we can ‘eliminate’ Carter from the game. Carter will be present in the 
game as ‘hidden force’, reinforcing the force of each one of the other players.  
 Summarizing, we are on the table. We have two real players: Begin versus 
Sadat. We have 52 cards (a pack of cards) which represent the object that is at stake      
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–the occupied territories during the ’67 War–. We have the goal: the peace in the 
Middle East. 
 
 It is the moment to look at the cards. ‘Who has what?’ Before the distribution, 
we have agreed that: 
 1. A pack of cards have 52 cards divided in 4 equal
24
 suits.  
 2.  Each suit will symbolize an aspect of the object (political, financial, social 
and cultural). 
 3.  Each card will symbolize a rational argument in pro the object on a specific 
aspect. In fact, we will turn the rational arguments in pro the object into 
mathematical values –cards– and risk them based on rules of the Bridge 
game (these rules, as we have seen at the chapter [1.1], are a probabilistic 
combinatorial calculus, the hazard doesn’t take never part).  
 4. The spades’ suit will symbolize the political object aspect. 
 5. The hearts’ suit will symbolize the financial object aspect. 
 6. The diamonds’ suit will symbolize the social object aspect. 
 7. The clubs’ suit will symbolize the cultural object aspect. 
 8. We have only one object to play: the occupied territories during the ’67 
War, but the territories are five: Jerusalem East, the Sinai Peninsula, the 
West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights (they are named in order of 
importance. This order will be used in the future for the cards distribution). 
 9. The decreasing value cards order is: AS, K, Q, J, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 it is 
the equal for each suit. 
 10. The card value in itself is: AS=4 points; K=3points; Q=2 points; J=1point; 
for the others is null. 
 11.  As we have 5 objects (or ‘sub objects’) and 13 cards for suit. We will agree 
that in each suit, every two consecutive cards will symbolize one object 
                                                          
24
 ‘Equal’ in number (13 cards each suit), but not in score, it varies in each suit. Playing Bridge the score 
is important but, in our simulation, the suit score is not important at all because in our case the importance 
comes from the argument related with the object that the card symbolizes in each concrete suit.  
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according to the order of importance given over objects, cards and suits (e.g. 
AS and K of spades will symbolize the political arguments in pro to 
Jerusalem East; Q and J in hearts will symbolize the financial arguments in 
pro to Sinai Peninsula; 10 and 9 in diamonds will symbolize the social 
arguments in pro to West Bank; 8 and 7 in clubs will symbolize the cultural 
arguments in pro to Gaza; and 6 and 5 of each suit will symbolize the 
arguments in pro to the Golan Heights).  
 12.  Consequently, we will always have three ‘surplus’ cards (the 4, 3 and 2 of 
each suit), these will be the ‘added value’ in pro the generic object aspect 
(e.g.: the 4, 3 and 2 of spade will symbolize the ‘added political value’ in 
pro the Object –all territories occupied during the ’67 War–). 
  
 Once we have agreed these 12 points, we can distribute the cards: 
- Spades distribution (political arguments in pro): 
AS: Political argument in pro of Jerusalem East. Value in itself=4 points. 
 For Begin (It is the Jewish Holy City). 
K: Political argument in pro Jerusalem East. Value in itself=3 points. For 
 Sadat (It is the Third Muslim Holy City and it is an old, previously to the 
’67 War, Muslim territory from Jordan). 
Q: Political argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
 For Begin (It is a war conquest and it entails the control on the one Suez 
 Canal’s bank). 
J: Political argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
 For Sadat (It is the historic Egyptian Territory and it entails the Egyptian 
 control on the two Suez Canal’s banks). 
10: Political argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
 Begin (It is a war conquest). 
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9: Political argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For
 Sadat (It is an old, previously to the ’67 War, Muslim territory from 
Jordan). 
8: Political argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It is 
 a war conquest). 
7: Political argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (It is 
 an old, previously to the ’67 War, Egyptian territory). 
6: Political argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
 For Begin (It is a war conquest). 
5: Political argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
 For Sadat (It is an old territory, previously to the ’67 War, Muslim territory 
 from Syria). 
 4, 3 and 2: The added political generic value over the occupied territories. 
 Value in itself=0 points. 4: for Begin (he is the present ‘landowner’); 3: for 
 Sadat (the mediator, Carter offers it because he need a ‘foot’ into the East 
 World); 2: for Begin (Carter is the ally of Begin then, he cans not ‘snatch’ 
 them to Begin. And we should remember that Israel has nuclear weapons                 
 –manufactured at the nuclear plant in Dimona–). 
 
- Hearts distribution (financial arguments in pro): 
AS: Financial argument in pro of Jerusalem East. Value in itself=4 points. 
For Begin (It is the Jewish and Christian Holy City. The religious tourism is 
a high potential financial source). 
K: Financial argument in pro Jerusalem East. Value in itself=3 points. For 
Sadat (It is the third Muslim Holy City. The religious tourism is a high 
potential financial source, perhaps, not so directly to Egypt, but to the 
Muslim world, more concretely, to Jordan, the landowner of Jerusalem East 
before the ’67 War).  
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Q: Financial argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
For Begin (It entails the control of one of the Suez Canal’s banks). 
J: Financial argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
For Sadat (It is an old Egyptian territory, previously to the ’67 War. It 
entails the Egyptian control for the two Suez Canal’s banks). 
10: Financial argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Begin (It could potentially contribute to increase the Gross Domestic 
Product). 
9: Financial argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Begin too (The territory could be developed economically but it wouldn't be 
a benefit for Egypt as it didn't belong to him). 
8: Financial argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It 
could potentially contribute to increase the Gross Domestic Product). 
7: Financial argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (It is 
an old Egyptian territory, previously to the ’67 War. It could potentially 
contribute to increase the Gross Domestic Product). 
6: Financial argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
For Begin (Israel needs the water from the Golan Heights). 
5: Financial argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
Also for Begin (Egypt cannot have financial interest in a territory that didn´t 
belong to him). 
4, 3 and 2: The added financial generic value over the occupied territories. 
Value in itself=0 points. 4: for Begin (he is already the ‘landowner’); 3: for 
Sadat (the mediator, Carter offer it because he needs the Egyptian oil); 2: 
for Begin (Carter is the ally of Begin then, he cannot betrays Begin). 
 
- Diamonds distribution (social arguments in pro): 
AS: Social argument in pro of Jerusalem East. Value in itself=4 points. 
For Begin (It is the Jewish Holy City. It is the only one territory really 
occupied to the Jewish population). 
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K: Social argument in pro Jerusalem East. Value in itself=3 points. For 
Begin (It is similar to the previous, the Jewish population is the majority in 
Jerusalem East). 
Q: Social argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
For Sadat (The majority population is Egyptian. It is an old Egyptian 
territory previously to the ’67 War). 
J: Social argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. For 
Begin (It gives the opportunity to increase population). 
10: Social argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Sadat (The majority of the population is Palestine). 
9: Social argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Begin (It gives the opportunity to increase population). 
8: Social argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (The 
majority population is Egyptian/Palestine. It is an old Egyptian territory 
previously to the ’67 War). 
7: Social argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It 
gives the opportunity to increase population). 
6: Social argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Sadat (The majority of the population is Palestine and/or Muslim). 
5: Social argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Begin (It gives the opportunity to increase population). 
4, 3 and 2: The added social generic value over the occupied territories. 
Value in itself=0 points. 4 and 3: for Sadat (The majority of the population 
in the occupied territories is Egyptian, Palestine and/or Muslim, but not 
Jewish); 2: for Begin (he is the present ‘landowner’). 
 
- Clubs distribution (cultural arguments in pro): 
AS: Cultural argument in pro of Jerusalem East. Value in itself=4 points. 
For Begin (It is the Jewish Holy City). 
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K: Cultural argument in pro Jerusalem East. Value in itself=3 points. For 
Sadat (It is the third Muslim Holy City). 
Q: Cultural argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
For Sadat (Is is the memorable territory of Egypt). 
J: Cultural argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. 
For Sadat (The Sinai is the facto a historical Egyptian territory). 
10: Cultural argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Sadat (The majority population is Palestine). 
9: Cultural argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For 
Begin (It is located into the Holy Land’s border). 
8: Cultural argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (The 
majority of the population is Egyptian/Palestine. It is an old Egyptian 
territory previously to the ’67 War). 
7: Cultural argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It is 
located into the Holy Land’s border). 
6: Cultural argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
For Sadat (The majority of the population is Palestine or Muslim). 
5: Cultural argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. 
For Begin (It is located into the Holy Land’s border). 
4, 3 and 2: The added cultural generic value over the occupied territories. 
Value in itself=0 points. 4 and 2: to Sadat (The majority of the population 
on the occupied territories is Egyptian, Palestine and or Muslim, but not 
Jewish); 3: to Begin (Four out of the five territories are into the Holy Land’s 
border). 
 
Now, we know the options. The result is as follows: 
For Begin: 
♠  As, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 7 cards/6 points in ♠ 
♥  As, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2 = 9 cards/6 points in ♥ 
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♦  As, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2 = 7 cards/8 points in ♦ 
♣ As, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 5 cards/4 points in ♣ 
Total cards: C
28
52 Total points: P
24
40 
 
For Sadat: 
♠  K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 6 cards/4 points in ♠ 
♥  K, J, 7, 3 = 4 cards/4 points in ♥ 
♦  Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3 = 6 cards/2 points in ♦ 
♣ K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 8 cards/6 points in ♣ 
Total cards: C
24
52 Total points: P
16
40 
 
 Now it is the moment to kwon ‘which will be the trumps?’ But before, we would 
like to point out that though the number of cards is not equal in both, this is not a real 
problem, because the difference can be considered itself negligible, as we are 
considering a balance of 
+
/- 2 cards [per player] and the score in points represents 
24/40=60% for Begin and 16/40=40% for Sadat. This difference is acceptable because 
we need to have at least one player with the 30% of the points, in our case there are two 
players (not four), with 60% of points.  
 So, it is evident that Begin will decide on the trumps (he has the majority, 60%, 
of the points at stake and in this case also the cards, 107.6%).  To play a suit trumps is 
necessary to have at least the half + 1 of possible cards on this suit (13/2=6.5≈7cards) 
and desirable the half +2 that means 8 cards. Begin would like to play at trumps in 
hearts, but Sadat would like to play at trumps in clubs. As Begin is stronger at all suits, 
even in clubs because he has the AS + 4 cards to support this AS, he will decide that the 
trumps will be not-trumps. Sadat will agree to play at not-trumps. In the Bridge 
terminology the agreement is expressed as: 1♥ Begin, 2♣ Sadat, 3NT Begin, Pass 
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Sadat. The game starts and the promise is: ‘I, Begin, promise that playing at Not-
Trumps, I will achieve at least 18 tricks (because they are 9 to 4 players) over the 
possible 24 (not 26, as it would be, 52/2, because Egypt only has 24 cards)’. 
 
We are ready to the crucial moment of our game.  
Begin 
♠ As, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2  ♥ As, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2  ♦ As, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2  ♣ As, 9, 7, 5, 3 
♠ K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3           ♥ K, J, 7, 3                        ♦ Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3        ♣K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6,4,2  
Sadat 
 Sadat starts the game, at not-trumps is convenient to play the fourth of the long 
suit, or the highest of the sequence of long suit, in our case is the second. Then Sadat 
will play K♣, it is the only possibility to reinforce the Q♣ and J♣, because Begin will 
use the AS in other suits to reinforce his position and if Sadat plays before Begin, he 
will always lose. The only possibility for Sadat is to agree with everything, although he 
could remember his political and financial force. But, the only feasible options for 
Sadat are Q and J in clubs. In a real Bridge game, Sadat could win other tricks because 
there is a turn to play but being a conversation the turn is not really clear. 
 
 Therefore, ‘what is the true profit for Sadat?’ The true profit for Sadat is the 
cultural matter over the Sinai Peninsula (Q and J in clubs). ‘Where cans Sadat put the 
strength in this negotiation?’ Sadat only can put the strength on the importance of the 
return to the Sinai Peninsula. He will need to keep the negotiations around this matter 
all the time. That will be his key point.  
 ‘What is the true profit for Begin?’ The true profit for Begin is to reaffirm his 
power in the region.  
 
 At this time, it is the moment to remember the principle shouldn't be forgotten, 
that is: not condition the game’s result. ‘What happened in Camp David?’ The 
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agreement was to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. And the goal, the framework for 
peace in the Middle East was achieved, and the framework for the conclusion of a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel was achieved too.  
 So we can conclude with two remarks: 
 1.  That our forecast on the Camp David Accords has been right. And we can 
assert, despite that many people thinks that the Camp David Accords were a failure, that 
the Camp David Accords were a resounding success. According to the previous 
[reflection], the best rational decision is the intersection point between ‘f(optimization)’ 
and ‘f(satisfaction). This point will be, at the same time, the fruit of optimizing to 
maximum our true possibilities and not losing anything that could be lost before the 
negotiation starts. Herein the satisfaction: obtaining all obtainable and losing only the 
indispensable. To get more is a ‘gift’ [and to get less is] a ‘loss’ but not the fruit a 
rational decision because this would be the result of a mistake in any negotiation. 
Therefore, we can say that the Bridge bridges both spirals in the specific case of […] 
negotiations, because it mixes the optimization (obtaining all obtainable) and the 
satisfaction (losing only the indispensable, what has been lost just [to start] the 
negotiation process) with the implementation. The Bridge is not only a theory; it is a 
theory that can be implemented in reality. 
 2. The Bridge game is a good application to analyse the real possibilities in an 
[…] negotiation because it bridges both spirals to these specific cases, and because it 
mixes the optimization (obtaining all obtainable) and the satisfaction (losing only the 
indispensable, [that one is already] lost before the negotiation) together with the real 
implementation. The Bridge is not only a theory, it is a theory that turns the conversion 
of countless variables (the arguments) in countable variables (the cards and their 
values), so we can play and we can also make the other way round and seeing what had 
happened. Therefore the Bridge could be a tool for the rational analysis of […] 
negotiations. 
 [We have reached the moment to go through the lights and shadows of the 
Bridge application to negotiations.]    
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Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. A bridge toward negotiations. Lights and Shadows [This 
chapter is taken from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 82-84. You will find in square brackets 
the additions and/or alterations to the original text.]  
 As we announced at the [introductory pages of this ‘Act’], [this chapter is an 
attempt] to answer to the following questions: ‘To what extent is it possible to consider 
Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of the […] negotiations?’ ‘What light does 
it provide to our understanding of the […] negotiations?’ ‘Which are its limitations?’ 
‘How could we overcome these limitations?’  
 
 About the first question: ‘to what extent is it possible to consider Bridge as an 
element for a rational analysis of the […] negotiations?’ the answer has already been 
suggested at the conclusion of the previous chapter. [Firstly,] we would like to clarify 
the fact that the Bridge is not only a theory but a theory that turns the conversion of 
countless variables (the arguments) in countable variables (the cards and their values), 
because of this we can play, but we can also take the other way round and see what had 
happened. The Bridge connecting the two spirals has become an abducing tool, that is, 
the Bridge makes possible to propose the following syllogism: we have a great premise 
and it’s evident, and we have other lesser, which is only evident or only probable, [then 
Bridge allow us for linking both together]. We have the ‘theoretical spiral’, which starts 
from a theoretical deductive process, and it is evident; and we have the implementation, 
the international negotiation in itself, which is starts from an empirical inductive process 
because not all negotiation details are evident or probable. Finally we need something to 
bridge, to link, both and that can let us to arrive to a true conclusion. As the Bridge 
makes possible to turn the negotiation of countless variables (that is, the empirical 
values) into countable variables (the theoretical values); and we can also do the other 
way round, then we can find the hidden link between both. We are now ready to arrive 
to a true conclusion. The Bridge bridges both studies: “(...) prescriptive studies, 
concerned with procedures for achieving good outcomes, and the descriptive studies, 
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focused on understanding how people negotiate.”25 The creation of the game is founded 
on the understanding of how people negotiate, and to play it is the research for the best 
possible outcome. Even if the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory, it offers the 
possibility of not being only a laboratory analysis. In this way, the Bridge application is 
a step forward in the Adjusted Winner Procedure
26
 (Brams & Taylor 1996) [because] 
in the Bridge we ascribe a value over the different aspects of the issue, and that’s the 
same starting point that the Adjusted Winner Procedure, but the Bridge puts these 
values at risk between themselves and, simultaneously, between the [game] players [...]. 
The value shifts from virtual to real [and] it is a constant feed-back.  
 
 In order to answer the question ‘what light does it provide to our understanding 
of the […] negotiations?’, we think that the Bridge gives us the opportunity to affirm 
more strongly if a concrete […] negotiation was, or will be, a success or a failure. As 
‘linkage’ element it permits us, simultaneously, an overview and an internal detailed 
vision. We would need to remember now the fact that the winner is the pair that in more 
turns has reached the 100% of the possible tricks. Therefore, the Bridge application 
talks us about the degree of true success or true failure. Often we conclude: ‘the 
negotiation was or will be a success’ or ‘the negotiation was or will be a failure’ but 
quite often we mistake our wishes and/or fears with our real possibilities and we assess 
incorrectly events. The right assess over events is the only sure way towards the future, 
and it is learning to the future. It is the possibility to accept to negotiate or not in 
function of our cards and real possible tricks with them.  
 
                                                          
25
 Michel Rudnianski & Hélène Bestougeff, “Bridging Games and Diplomacy”. In: Diplomacy Games. 
Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). 
Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 150. 
26
 Cf. Quoted by Rudolf Schüssler, “Adjusted Winner” (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David 
Accords—Valuable Tools for Negotiatiors?”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International 
Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 
2007, p. 283-296. 
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 Finally, ‘which are the limits of the Bridge?’ and ‘how could we [overcome] 
these limitations?’  
  The Bridge has a big limitation when [there is one or a combination of these 
reasons:] 
- The issue for negotiating does not agree with the aim of the negotiation. 
 Application of the Bridge requires that object/s and goal/s share the same 
 internal structure so that their different aspects may be represented by the 
 same suits. 
- The power is very close to the opponents. In this case probably the best 
 solution would be the Adjusted Winner Procedure, because it calculates 
 issues and not relationships between them and the players. 
- The control over the time and the space. All change, even if it is very small, 
 will change the game. You can do a very good preparation and an 
 unexpected event at the last minute could change all, even if we have done 
 the calculus of gains and losses in connection with the different 
 combinatorial possibilities ([…]  we should make it before getting into 
 the  negotiations themselves because it’s the only possibility to know how 
 often  the favorable scenario for negotiating take place). This is much more 
 common that we could think, because the negotiations are implemented for 
 individuals, and individuals are always unpredictable at 100%.  This could 
 be ‘solved’ with a real good preparation [knowing always remains some 
 incertitude, subjectivity is always on place, it is intrinsic to the players          
 –subjects in themselves-]. Briefly, the Bridge applied [to] […] negotiations 
 is an analysis about ‘when saying what?’  and about ‘if the 
 arguments we have can be tackle in the negotiation’.   In case of doubt we 
 could always remember Wittgenstein saying: “whereof one cannot speak, 
 thereof one must be silent”27 
                                                          
27
 Luwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 7. Source online: 
http://home.umail.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav.html 
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 […] 
 [Despite all, the GREAT limitation of the Bridge application to negotiations is 
and will be the ‘true’ subjectivity. It could be named ‘first subjectivity’ because it is 
present from the beginning of the process and will be liable for two inherent shadows to 
us and another one, indirect, implied in our interlocutor.]     
 [Direct shadows:]                         
[1.  To decide what arguments to choose to be employed during the 
 negotiation.] 
  [2. To assign each argument the right card to symbolise it.] 
 [Indirect shadow:] 
  [1. Even trying to be as good as possible during the negotiation process we 
  cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments, we cannot predict 
  it.] 
 
 [The next pages are meant to throw some light on each of the above shadows. 
Shadows will definitely persist (negotiator -subject with subjectivity- is always one of 
the necessary elements in a negotiation), but they can be lighter.] 
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ACT II: NEURO-LINGUISTIC PATTERNS (NLP) 
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 Going the next step ahead, as mentioned in the introductory pages each ‘Act’ 
aims to be a part of a ‘tragedy’: a ‘conceptual mimesis’ of the used arguments, meant to 
produce a ‘catharsis’, an improvement on the negotiation process. Thus, this ‘Act’ will 
be our second step where our task will address to the limits, with the purpose to reduce 
them, to throw some light in the shadows. 
 
 At this step the tool chosen to try to reduce the limitations has been Neuro-
Linguistic Patterns (hereunder, NLP); it will be applied to the previously showed 
shadows. NLP has been selected because all the flaws in a negotiation process are a 
product of the negotiator’s weakness shown through his arguments. If we want to study 
flaws in arguments, we are in the NLP territory. 
 
 On the next pages we will try to give an answer about to what could NLP do to 
illuminate the limitations. Firstly, we will introduce NLP in order to decide whether 
NLP may be considered a useful tool to make rational decisions in the world of 
negotiations     –Chapter 2.1-. Right before we deal with limitations in the light of NLP 
we will take a look at how are these Patterns working in our mind –Chapter 2.2-. To 
finish, we will look at the shadows under the light of NLP –Chapter 2.3-. 
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Chapter 2.1: Are NLP a useful tool to make rational decisions in the world of 
negotiations? 
 In order to give an answer to this question, we should start by defining what are 
NLP.  
 Neuro-Linguistic Programming is the study of [Neuro-
 Linguistic Patterns], [of] how we think and communicate, with 
 ourselves and with others, and how we can use this to get the 
 results we want. (Centre of Excellence 2014a: 11) 
 Therefore, reading this definition we can trust NLP will be the right tool to 
reduce the limitations. However, when we go deeper in we discover that NLP more 
about Programming than about Patterns. It is more focused on the techniques to put into 
practice and the results than on the structure of arguments themselves. Moreover, since 
the beginning of NLP there has been a huge amount of literature on NLP applied to 
business (‘business’ means ‘negotiation’ per se). This is not the interest of this study. 
This piece of research is not about how to say (Programming) an argument -in a 
semiotic meaning-; we are analyzing how to build it, its structure –syntax- and the 
semantic implication of the syntax chosen (syntactic Pattern form) in addition to how is 
it taking place –intonation- (pragmatic Pattern form) and what is behind of the 
manifested form, what is ‘hidden’, as modelling, a precise syntax and its intonation for 
each argument. 
  
 Now, we can agree that NLP (‘P’ understood as Patterns) are a useful tool to 
make decisions in the world of negotiations. Could NLP also be useful to make also 
‘rational’ decisions?  Yes, definitely, because we are keeping the ‘P’ in NLP as Patterns, 
that is, as syntax + ‘semantics of syntax in itself’28, as ‘grammar’ in Montague’s 
                                                          
28
 We are understanding ‘semantics of syntax in itself’ as the representational value that the syntactic 
form takes in our mind (i.e.: when we hear a conjunctive sentence, our mind considers it as real, meaning 
true, every part of the conjunctive sentence). 
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meaning
29
. Moreover, we know that the rational value of true is in syntax, in accordance 
with: 
 -  If an assertion is true, its denial will be false (taking the same sense as in 
classic logic). 
 -  For a true conjunctive sentence, each part of it has to be true (taking the same 
sense as in classic logic). 
 -  For a true disjunctive sentence, at least one of its parts must be true (taking 
the same sense as in classic logic). 
 -  For a true conditional sentence, we consider only the case our mind takes as 
natural: if the antecedent is true then the consequent will be true.  
 - Any true universal sentence or necessary sentence has to be true for every 
case (taking the same sense as in classic logic). 
 - Any true particular (existential) sentence or possible sentence, it has to be true 
at least for one case (taking the same sense as in classic logic). 
 If we are to be true as negotiators, then our sentences will be true sentences. So, 
their syntax will be in accordance with what has been said just above. So we can 
conclude that NLP are a useful tool to make rational decisions in the world of 
negotiations. 
 
 Now we are almost ready to deal with throwing some light to the limitations 
suggested at the end of the previous ‘Act’. Right before engaging in limitations, we will 
take a look at how these Patterns work in our mind. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Cf. MONTAGUE, R. (1970). 
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Chapter 2.2: How do Linguistic Patterns work in our mind?
30
 
 Linguistic Patterns, syntactical expressions of thoughts, work in two directions: 
 -   Versus us direction: when somebody is talking to us we are doing linguistic 
assumptions. These assumptions are creating a ‘new’ syntax structure (the same or 
different that the original), meaning a ‘new’ true value (it could also be the same or 
different that the original value in the mind of the speaker). And that one, the ‘new’ one, 
will be over that we go to reply. As we cannot to have a control of the original meaning 
in the mind of our interlocutor, we cannot to be sure if our answer is really in 
accordance with what he has said. Nevertheless, we can learn that a great lesson from it: 
the same happens the other way round. 
 -  Versus our interlocutor direction. We cannot control the structure of his 
speech but we can have a good command over our language expression. To reach this 
command we need to assess presuppositions, or rather, linguistic assumptions; they are 
basically:  
  Syntactic Patterns 
 -  Using nouns presupposes the existence of the entity to which they are 
applied. [Assertive sentence] 
 - Using copulative sentences presupposes that each one of them is the case. 
[Conjunctive sentence] 
 - Using ‘or’ presupposes exclusion/inclusion. [Disjunctive sentence] 
 -  Using the conditional structure, like if … then ... or similar, presupposes 
a cause and its effect. In fact, every cause-effect can be represented as a conditional 
relation (this is how our mind understands viscerally the conditional pattern, even when 
not every conditional sentence is a proper representation of the cause-effect relation, 
however, in our mind a conditional sentence produces always a cause-effect pattern). 
[Conditional sentence] 
                                                          
30
 Cf. Centre of Excellence, 2014a: 55-71. 
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 - Using quantifiers or modal operators presupposes necessity or 
possibility. [Universal/Necessary or Particular/Possible sentence] 
 -  WARNING! When negative sentences are true, their affirmative mood 
will be false and vice versa. This is tricky, because our mind acts quite oddly in such a 
case, as in fact “the mind cannot process a negative instruction, for example if I say 
don’t think of the colour red, what comes to mind?” (PETRUZZI, J., 2012: 77) and vice 
versa: “Suggestions which logically are negatives but create an internal representation 
which the unconscious acts on as a positive suggestion.” (Centre of Excellence 2014a: 
69). 
 Intonation Patterns (pragmatic Pattern form) 
 -  Question/Statement/Command. An argument is not just a sentence, an 
argument is also a pronounced sentence; then, intonation is as important as the 
argument itself.  
 Special Pattern 
 -   Silence: “silence can be interpreted as having meaning. (…) Our mind 
and body are part of the same system, so the thoughts we have affect our physiology, 
and are shows up in our non-verbal interactions.” (Centre of Excellence 2014a: 20). 
Still more, silence is the replacement of at least a word, or even for the expression of a 
whole thought. Never naïve, silence is never an empty set or an infinite set, silence is 
always the expression at least one of the elements of a limited set of possible elements 
to take up that place. 
  
 So far we have been speaking about the ‘visible’ structure of Patterns. Patterns, 
for us realize, need to take place in a concrete expression (word/sentence + intonation + 
body expression or silence + body expression); this is why we cannot overlook what is 
behind every concrete expression. In the farthest depths of every one of us are our 
beliefs and values (‘hidden’ Patterns structure), they are modeling our expressions and 
not only its contents, also its form –syntax + intonation-. Being aware of how beliefs 
     
NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS  
in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK                                                                         
 
  
MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors                       
 
 
46 
 
and values are modeling expression forms is not easy (direct/indirect syntactical 
patterns/intonations/body language. For ex.: usually oriental cultures would choose the 
indirect form), but it is the essential key to achieve rapport or not, so we should not 
disdain them when evaluating the patterns that we are going to use. When we are 
communicating to somebody, we can know and/or share the beliefs and values with 
him, or not, but if we really want to communicate we have to shape our expressions in a 
‘common’ territory to guarantee comprehension, to be sure our patterns are recognized. 
 Knowing all of that we can make as many combinations, variations and/or 
permutations as we want. So, we can say, being right, that if we are aware of this, we 
can manage our arguments as best as possible in the desired way; even if we “don’t get 
dealt the best cards in life, though we have a choice in how we respond. And it is within 
our response that our lives are shaped.” (PETRUZZI, J., 2012: 29). The desired way 
cannot be a manipulative style because “manipulative behaviour never works. Usually 
the other person will spot what the manipulator is trying to do because they seem ‘false’ 
or not fully human in their responses. (…) If you respect the other person and dovetail 
your desired outcome with theirs, you will get a win-win situation and everyone is 
satisfied. If not, neither party will achieve their outcome.” (Centre of Excellence 2014a: 
29). 
 
 Now it is time to deal with the possibility to throw some light on the suggested 
limitations at the end of the previous ‘Act’. 
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Chapter 2.3: Shadows under the light of NLP 
  Going back to the end of the previous ‘Act’, in Chapter 1.3, we can revive here 
‘true’ limitations for the Bridge application to negotiations and look at them under the 
NLP: can they throw any light into the shadows? We will go through the limitations one 
by one. 
 
 We will start looking to the ones we named ‘direct shadows’, the ones inherent 
to our own subjectivity. 
 1.  To decide what arguments to choose to be employed during the negotiation.  
 As we have already seen, we cannot be sure about what arguments, in the 
meaning of their contents, should be chosen. But we are responsible of choosing the 
best syntax and intonation pattern and/or the best silence and body language pattern, for 
each of the arguments. To do our best, we should always keep in mind where is the 
common territory of beliefs and values (our own and the interlocutor’s) and we should 
make arguments be born there.  
 At the moment, there is no doubt about one thing we have to take into account 
when we choose arguments to employ in a negotiation process: we must take a very 
special care using arguments under a negative assertion form; they will always suggest 
the opposite (a positive suggestion) in the mind of our interlocutor.  
 2. To assign each argument the right card to symbolise it. 
 We will never have one hundred per cent certainty to have chosen the right card, 
the one that best symbolize the each argument. However, it is for sure that the better our 
knowledge of the common territory of beliefs and values territory, the better the 
connection, and therefore also the accuracy, between argument and its symbol in a 
playing card.  
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 Regarding the ‘indirect shadow’, that one implied in the subjectivity of our 
interlocutor, we cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments, we cannot 
predict it. About that no light is coming in from NLP. We could only suspect that 
replied arguments will probably come from the interlocutor’s beliefs and values, but we 
cannot be sure about this. 
 
  Next ‘Act’ will be an attempt to pursue the first ‘direct shadow’ and the 
‘indirect shadow’. For both, we will be going deeper in syntax, because syntax is the 
only rational pattern for an argument, therefore syntax is the only discipline where we 
should do our best and where we can predict the outcome (knowing that the limit to a 
right prediction is always the form of expression of beliefs and values). 
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ACT III:  CRYPTIC LANGUAGE: RUSSIAN CARDS  
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 As promised at the end of the previous ‘Act’, in this one we will tackle deeper 
the syntactic patterns as a tool to decide what arguments should be chosen to employ 
during the negotiation, as well as to predict replies, both still in the darkness.  
 Along the next pages we will try to give an answer to how to create right 
syntactic patterns which can cause good and predictable replies. Hence, we will analyse 
a cryptic language: Russian Cards (van DITMARSCH, 2008) –Chapter 3.1-. We will 
extract two key lessons from it –Chapter 3.2-. Thus, dialogical framework pattern will 
throw some light in the darkness –Chapter 3.3-. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS  
in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK                                                                         
 
  
MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors                       
 
 
51 
 
Chapter 3.1: Hunting Hackers. Is it useful to think like a ‘mute guest’ to prepare a 
negotiation talk thoroughly? 
 This chapter deals with a cryptic language: Russian Cards. The original problem 
was proposed at the Moscow Mathematics Olympiad in 2000
31
:  
 From a deck of seven distinct cards, Alice and Bob are each 
dealt three cards and Cathy is dealt the remaining card. None of 
the players knows any of the cards of the other players. Describe 
how, using a series of truthful public announcements, Alice and 
Bob can exchange information about the hands they hold 
without Cathy being able to deduce the owner of any card other 
than her own. (KELLERMAN, R., 2014: 1) 
  
 Thus we are inside a typical framework for a Dynamic Epistemic Logic 
(hereunder, DEL). The progress of knowledge depends on the public announcements
32
 
made by the knowledge subjects involved -for our case: Alice, Bob and Cathy-. We can 
say Alice and Bob are ‘active’ knowledge subjects and Cathy is just a ‘passive’ subject, 
like a ‘mute guest’.  
  
 ‘Is the ‘mute guest’ a true ‘passive’ subject or could be she a ‘disguised 
hacker’?’ The aim of this chapter is to answer this question. We will analyse the 
Russian Cards from the dialogical semantics because our interest is to find out what is 
happening in Cathy’s mind, what is Cathy thinking when she is listening 
announcements from Alice and Bob (as you can see, we are not using at the moment the 
word ‘knowledge’ for Cathy because the problem says: “Alice and Bob can exchange 
information about the hands they hold without Cathy being able to deduce the owner of 
any card other than her own”) So, our interest is in the field of semantics, what is the 
                                                          
31
 Cf. KELLERMAN, R. (2014) 
32
 Cf. van DITMARSCH, H., van der HOEK, W. & KOOI, B., 2008: 104-107. 
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meaning of what is being said. Only at the end of this reasoning, we will get to know 
what has changed in Cathy‘s knowledge. 
 For this analysis we will take the Russian Cards problem developed by van 
Ditmarsch (2008, pp. 97-104 et 108). First, we will tackle its dialogical semantics form 
for the general case. Then we will be ready to think what is happening in Cathy’s mind 
in each case shown. Note that in the van Ditmarsch’s Russian Cards the names of the 
characters have been changed: Alice is Ann (a), Bob is Bill (b) and Cathy becomes Cath 
(c).  
 
A dialogical semantics
33
 for the Russian cards 
1. Mathematical rules for the Russian cards: 
 1.1. Characteristics of the game: 
 We have three players: a; b; c. 
 We have a stack with seven different cards. They are numbered: 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 
6. 
C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
 The card deal for player a and for player b are the same: 3 cards each; player c 
gets only 1 card.  
 The language assumes expressions in the form gR(m,n,p), that should be 
interpreted as player g has the cards m; n; p. More precisely:  
aR(m, n, p); bR(m', n', p'); cR(m'') 
where m; n; p; m’; n’; p’; m” are (different) numbers from 0 to 6. 
In order to the simplify the notation, we will follow the convention used by van 
Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi, from whom expressions of the form  aR(m, n, 
p) are taken: mnpa  and so on. 
 
                                                          
33
 Cf. for rules of dialogical semantics –points: 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this section- S. RAHMAN & N. 
CLERBOUT (2015) and J. REDMOND & M. FONTAINE (2011). 
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1.2. Objective of the game: 
 The game has only one objective and it consists in two parts: 
 Part 1: players a and b interchange information about the cards they hold. 
 Part 2: after this sharing, player c must be still ignorant, or in others 
 words, he still knows only his own card and does not know who has what. 
 
Hence the objective of the game can be rendered with the following expression 
[Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄~Kc(mnpa)˄~Kc(m'n'
p'b)] that reads. 
 
 1.3. Knowledge stage or terms of the game: 
 The 3 players (a; b; c) know that 7 cards have been dealt. They are not 
duplicated and they are numbered  0 to 6: C={0,1, …, 6} 
 The deal has been: C(a)
3
7*C(b)
3
4*C(c)
1
1= aR(
3
7); bR(
3
4); cR(
1
1)=140 deals are 
possible. 
 Player a and player b have to let each other know the cards they hold without 
discovering it to player c. Player c has to remain ignorant about who has what 
after their announcements (in accordance with the objective of the game             
–previous section: 1.2.- and inside the framework of the logic of the public 
announcements –next section: 1.4.-). 
 At first, every player knows only his own cards. 
 After the deal the cards distribution has been: 012a; 345b; 6c. 
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2. Particle rules: 
 
Announcement structure 
 
Attack 
 
Defence 
!α˄β 
The attacker chooses the defence 
?L∧ !α 
?R∧ !β 
!α∨β 
The defender chooses the defence 
?∨ !α 
!β 
!α→β !α (α is assumed to occur) !β 
!α !α ---------------------------- 
!∀xAx ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) !Ak 
!∃xAx ?∃ (could you show me one, please?)        !Ak (k is chosen by the defender) 
!⎕34Aci ?cj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the 
attacker) 
!Acj   
!◊35Aci 
 
?◊ (could you show me a case, please?)   
!Acj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by 
the defender) 
 
 
3. Structural rules for a game played inside the intuitionistic logic: 
 Player c always remains as ‘mute guest’. 
 The game starts with an assertion from player a. 
 By rotating turns, player a first, then b, and again a and b, make a public 
announcement, either as an assertion or as a question. 
 Each announcement -assertion or question- must be true. 
 Each announcement produces a new ‘engagement’ that adds to the previous 
ones, making an ‘engagement’ chain. No player can avoid him ‘engagement 
chain’. 
                                                          
34
 It will be the same in all the cases where there is a modal operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, 
temporal or a combination of them.  
35
 Idem. 
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 No player can repeat an argument already attacked. If an argument is repeated it 
will be because the player arrives to the same argument through a different way 
(i.e.: from another hypothesis). 
 Each announcement has to have a reply. It is not possible to leave an 
announcement without reply. At the end of the game each attack must be 
completed with its defence unless: 
 
 The attack has been against a negation sentence. Then no reply, no 
defence is possible (it has already been mentioned how our mind 
reacts to negative sentences –cf. Chapter 2.2, p. 44-). 
i.e: Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 68. 
 
 O   P  
    ! AA 0 
1 ? [AA] 0  ! A 2 
3 ! A 2  --  
       O Wins    
 
 
 The attack has been a double negative sentence. Negative sentences 
can only be attacked one at time because, as just seen two points 
before, no player can avoid his ‘engagement chain’, so no player can 
say !A when he has already said !A. Therefore, faced with attacks 
against double negative sentences a double attack will not be possible 
(being A an elementary proposition). 
i.e.:  Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 69. 
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 O   P  
    ! AA 0 
1 ! A 0    
 --   ! A 2 
3 ! A 2  --  
                O Wins   
 
 The attack has been an elementary proposition and the respondent 
does not have the possibility to reply the same elementary proposition.  
i.e: Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 66. 
 
 O   P  
    ! QaQb 0 
1 ! Qa      0   3 
               O Wins 
 
 “Attack is the best form of defence”. If we can choose between attacking or 
defending, in most instances we should attack first. 
 The game ends when a knows b’s deal and vice versa, and c remains ignorant.  
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4. Formalisation for the general case: 
 
Case 3.1. 
OPPONENT (b) PROPOSER (a) 
 HYPOTHESIS THESIS  
H1 g≠g'≠c; g,g'є{a,b} !(012a∨012b)→[(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨ 
∨345b)] 
   0 
H2 C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
H3 
 
mnpg→(∼mnpg'∨∼m'n'm''g'∨ 
∨∼n'p'm''g'∨∼m'p'm''g'∨m'n'p'g')  
H4 {m≠n≠p≠m'≠n'≠p'≠m''}єC 
H5 m''є{c} then m''c 
1 !(012a∨012b) 0  ![(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨345b)]    4 
3 !012a     1 ?∨    2 
5 ?L∧ 4  !(012a∨012b)    6 
7 ?∨ 6  !012a    8 
9 ?R∧ 4  !(345a∨345b)  10 
11 ?∨ 10  !345b  20 
13 !012g→(∼012g'∨∼346g'∨∼456g'∨ 
∨∼356g'∨345g') 
 (3) 
H3 
!m/0;n/1;p/2;m'/3;n'/4;p'/5;m''/6 12  
15 !012a→(∼012b∨∼346b∨∼456b∨ 
∨∼356b∨345b) 
 (H1) 
 13 
!g/a;g'/b 14 
17 !∼012b∨∼346b∨∼456b∨∼356b∨
∨345b 
  15 !012a 16 
19 !345b  (H5)  
17 
?∧ 18 
 
Summary for case 3.1: a holds 123 and b holds 456. 
 
OR: 
 
 
 
 
     
NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS  
in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK                                                                         
 
  
MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors                       
 
 
58 
 
Case 3.2. 
OPPONENT (b) PROPOSER (a) 
 HYPOTHESIS THESIS  
H1 g≠g'≠c; g,g'є{a,b} !(012a∨012b)→[(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨ 
∨345b)] 
   0 
H2 C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
H3 
 
mnpg’→(∼mnpg∨∼m'n'm''g∨ 
∨∼n'p'm''g∨∼m'p'm''g∨m'n'p'g)  
H4 {m≠n≠p≠m'≠n'≠p'≠m''}єC 
H5 m''є{c} then m''c 
1 !(012a∨012b) 0  ![(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨345b)]    4 
3 !012b     1 ?∨    2 
5 ?L∧ 4  !(012a∨012b)    6 
7 ?∨ 6  !012b    8 
9 ?R∧ 4  !(345a∨345b)  10 
11 ?∨ 10  !345a  20 
13 !012g’→(∼012g∨∼346g∨∼456g∨ 
∨∼356g∨345g) 
 (3) 
H3 
!m/0;n/1;p/2;m'/3;n'/4;p'/5;m''/6 12  
15 !012b→(∼012a∨∼346a∨∼456a∨ 
∨∼356a∨345a) 
 (H1) 
 13 
!g/a;g'/b 14 
17 !∼012a∨∼346a∨∼456a∨∼356a∨
∨345a 
  15 !012b 16 
19 !345a  (H5)  
17 
?∧ 18 
 
Summary for case 3.2: a holds 456 and b holds 123. 
 
5. Interpretation keys: 
 External columns contain the intervention order number, that is, the game 
number moves. 
 In the internal double column the number of move that is being attacked is 
placed. If the number is placed on the left means that the opponent is attacking a 
move from the proposer [ex.: move 1 (opponent) is attacking move 0 
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(proposer)]. If the number is placed on the right, then the proposer is attacking a 
move from the opponent [ex.: move 2 (proposer) is attacking move 1 
(opponent)]. If there are others numbers in brackets above the attacked move 
number, this means: ‘as you said at move x or as you said at hypothesis x, I can 
attack you as I am doing now’ [ex.: move 14 (proposer) is attacking move 13 
(opponent), his attack is based on Hypothesis 1 (H1)]. 
 The centre columns contain announcements: centre left are the opponent’s 
announcements and centre right are the proposer’s. 
 Each announcement is preceded by a sign:  
!: This means that the announcement is an assertion.  
 Assertions could be the pragmatic form of an attack and also of a defence. 
?: This means that the announcement is not a ‘proper’ one, it is a question about 
a previous announcement. 
 Question could be the pragmatic form of an attack and also of a defence. 
 Each row comprises 6 boxes (from left to right):  
1. Box for the number of the opponent’s move. 
2. Box for the opponent’s announcement (attack or defence under the form of an 
assertion or a question). 
3. Box for the number of move attacked by the opponent to the proposer –if this 
is the case-. 
4. Box for the number of move attacked by the proposer to the opponent –if this 
is the case-. 
5. Box for the proposer’s announcement (attack or defence under the form of an 
assertion or a question). 
6. Box for the number of proposer’s move. 
 Box 2 and box 5 must be coordinated: if box 2 is an attack then box 5 must be its 
defence (and does not necessarily have to be the next move). Thus, we will hold 
an attack and its defence on the same row and it is not relevant if the defence is 
the next move or if it happens many moves after the attack (ex.: move 11 is an 
     
NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS  
in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK                                                                         
 
  
MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors                       
 
 
60 
 
attack by the opponent to move 10 of the proposer. This attack is defended         
–replayed- on proposer’s move 20).  
  
 Once we have dealt with the semantics for the general case, we should tackle the 
cases proposed by van Distmarch (2008) one by one, following the convention used by 
van Ditmarsch (i.e.: Exercise 4.72, etc.). This will help us answer the question we 
proposed: is the ‘mute guest’ a true ‘passive’ subject or could be he a ‘disguised 
hacker’? To accomplish this we are not going to formalise each case in a dialogical 
semantics form. We consider that we do not need ‘to repeat’ it for each case, once we 
know how dialogical semantics work, because our interest is in the ‘hidden column’, the 
one for the ‘mute guest’, Cath (c). So, we will hear the announcements as c would listen 
to them and we will imagine what kind of reflections would be happening in her mind. 
 
Exercise 4.72 (A five hand solution): Assume deal of cards 
012.345.6. Show that the following is a solution: Anne 
announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 246}” and Bill 
announces “Cath has card 6”. (van DISTMARCH, 2008: 103) 
 
Bill (b) (opponent) Ann (a) (proposer) Cath (c) (‘mute guest’) 
2 !6c !012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨246a 1 ??? 
 
What is c thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
1. How did b know I have card 6? 
2. If b said 6 and no other out of the four possible cards, those ones that b does not 
must be because: 
 2.1. In triads announced by a where card 6 is, there must be also at least one 
 of b’s cards. 
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 2.2. As each triad must guarantee the safety of the announcement, then no 
 one can be inside the ‘true zone’ of another player (you can only have  total 
 control of your ‘true zone’). To be sure, the only one solution passes to 
 include in each one of the triads, at least one proper card number of the 
 announcer. 
 2.3. In the triads where 6 is, there is also a card from b (as seen just 
 above: 2.1.). Thanks to this b knows these triads as not a’s triads. The triads 
 contain also one of a’s cards to guarantee the safety of the announcement (as 
 seen at 2.2.). 
  2.4. Therefore, if b announces, “Cath has card 6”, a does not have a triad 
 where the 6 is. 
3.  So c removes these triads from a’s announcement, and the result is a ‘new’ a’s 
announcement: !012a∨034a∨135a 
4. c asks herself what is a’s hand. To answer, she will be doing the following 
reasoning: 
  4.1. In the triads where 6 is (056; 246), there is also one card of a and 
 another of b, so: 
  a = 0; 2 then b = 5; 4 
  a = 5; 4 then b = 0; 2 
  a = 0; 4 then b = 2; 5 
  a = 2; 5 then b = 0; 4 
 4.2.  Next step in c’s reasoning is comparing these binomials to the three 
 remaining triads (as seen in 3.): 012a∨034a∨135a. The result is that either a 
 holds 012 or 034, therefore a holds 0 and b must hold either 25 or 54, so 
 b holds 5. 
  Now c knows two of a’s triads for sure: 012a∨034a and one (135a) 
  like a ‘doubt’, we may say, because no light it is coming on that one 
  after comparing it to the triads including 6. 
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 4.3.  Now, c compares the possible a’s binomial to the triads containing 
 card 6 (056; 246), looking to find more information, but nothing new is 
 coming up. 
  012 to 056: as b said c holds 6, and c knows already b holds 5 and a 
  holds 0.  
 034 to 056: This is the same case as above. 
 012 to 246: as b said c holds 6, and c knows a holds 0, and 0 should 
 be together with 2 or with 4. For this case c would think a holds 2 and 
 b holds 4.  
 034 to 246: This is the inverse of the case before, here c 
 would think a holds 4 and b holds 2. In this case c would be in a 
 GREAT mistake. So from here we can conclude that this part of the 
 reasoning (4.3.) is not reliable. Therefore the reasoning of c should 
 always conclude at the previous step (4.2.). 
c’s most likely final state of knowledge: 
012a∨034a 
a = 0; 2   then  b = 5; 4.  Therefore 012a and 543b  
or 
a = 0; 4  then   b = 2; 5.  Therefore 034a and 251b 
 As the deal has been: C(a)
3
7*C(b)
3
4*C(c)
1
1= aR(
3
7); bR(
3
4); cR(
1
1)=140 deals are 
possible. At the beginning, c knows she holds 6, so the possible deals are only the ones 
where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 possible deals: C(a)
3
6*C(b)
3
3= aR(
3
6); bR(
3
3)=20. 
In fact, Cath is only hesitating between two possible deals [(012a∧543b)∨(034a∧251b)], 
thus c knows the 18 deals that are not possible. If 20 unknown deals mean 100% of c’s 
ignorance, then 2 unknown will be 10% of c’s ignorance. In this case, Cath has reached 
a knowledge of 90% according to the deals and 33.3333% knowledge about the 
composition of each deal (c knows one card from a (0) and one from b (5)).  
Total c’s knowledge is 93.3333%  Total c’s ignorance is 6.6667% 
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c’s final state of knowledge including the ‘doubt’ (135a): 
012a∨034a∨135a 
Total c’s knowledge is 85%  Total c’s ignorance is 15% 
In this case c cannot reach more knowledge because no card is common for all three 
of a’s possible deals. 
 
Exercise 4.73 (A six hand solution): Assume deal of cards 
012.345.6. Show that the following is a solution: Anne 
announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236}” and 
Bill announces “Cath has card 6”. (van DISTMARCH, 2008: 
103) 
 
Bill (b) (opponent) Ann (a) (proposer) Cath (c) (‘mute guest’) 
2 !6c !012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨146a∨236a  1 ??? 
 
What is c thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
1. How did b know I have card 6? 
2. If b said 6 and no other out of the four possible cards, those ones b does not have 
must be because: 
2.1. In triads announced by a, where card 6 is, there is also at least one of b’s 
cards. 
 2.2. As each triad must guarantee the safety of the announcement, then no 
 one can be inside the ‘true zone’ of another player (you can only have total 
 control of your ‘true zone’). To be sure, the only one solution passes to 
 include in each one of the triads, at least one proper card number of the 
 announcer.  
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 2.3. In the triads where 6 is, there is also a card from b (as seen just 
 above: 2.1.). Thanks to this b knows these triads as not a’s triads. The triads 
 contain also one of a’s cards to guarantee the safety of the announcement (as 
 seen at 2.2.). 
  2.4. Therefore, if b announces, “Cath has card 6”, a does not have a triad 
 where 6 is. 
3.  So c removes these triads from a’s announcement, and the result is a ‘new’ a’s 
announcement: !012a∨034a∨135a 
4. c asks herself what is a’s hand? To answer, she will be doing the following 
reasoning: 
  4.1. In the triads where 6 is (056; 146; 236), there is also one one card of a 
 and another of b, so: 
  a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3 
  a = 5; 4; 3 then b = 0; 1; 2 
  a = 0; 1; 3 then b = 5; 4; 2 
  a = 5; 4; 2 then b = 0; 1; 3 
  a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5 
  a = 5; 1; 2 then b = 0; 4; 3 
  a = 0; 4; 2 then b = 1; 3; 5 
  a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 4; 2 
 4.2. Next step in c’s reasoning is comparing the above triads (4.1.) to the 
 three  remaining triads (as seen in 3.): 012a∨034a∨135a. The result is that 
 every one of them could be possible because all are compatible with the 
 condition to include one card from a + one card from b + 6.  
c’s final state of knowledge: 
012a∨034a∨135a 
a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3.  Therefore 012a and 543b  
or 
a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5.  Therefore 034a and 125b 
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or 
a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2.  Therefore 135a and 042b 
 As the deal has been: C(a)
3
7*C(b)
3
4*C(c)
1
1= aR(
3
7); bR(
3
4); cR(
1
1)=140 deals are 
possible. At the beginning, c knows she holds 6, so now the possible deals are only the 
ones where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 possible deals: C(a)
3
6*C(b)
3
3= aR(
3
6); 
bR(
3
3)=20. In fact, Cath is only hesitating between three possible deals 
[(012a∧543b)∨(034a∧125b)∨(135a∧042b)], thus c knows 17 deals are not possible. If 20 
unknown mean 100% of c’s ignorance, then 3 unknown will be 15% of c’s ignorance. 
In this case, Cath has reached knowledge of 85%. In this case c cannot reach more 
knowledge because no card is common for all three of a’s possible deals. 
Total c’s knowledge is 85%  Total c’s ignorance is 15% 
 
Exercise 4.74 (A seven hand solution): Assume deal of cards 
012.345.6. Show that the following is a solution: Anne 
announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}” 
and Bill announces “Cath has card 6”. (van DISTMARCH, 
2008: 103) 
 
Bill (b) (opponent) Ann (a) (proposer) Cath (c) (‘mute guest’) 
2 !6c !012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨146a∨236a∨245a   1 ??? 
 
What is c thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
 Now, after doing the previous exercises, c has reached a quite refined method. She 
knows the procedure is: 
 1. To take off the triads where her card, 6, is. Then, for this case, the ‘new’ a’s 
announcement would be: !012a∨034a∨135a∨245a. 
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 2. She also knows it is not necessary to do step 4.3. That has been done during 
the first exercise and it was decided not to do it again because it was considered 
as a not reliable way. 
 3. Once she knows how the ‘new’ a’s announcement looks (an announcement 
that will not contain her card in any triad), she needs to compare the resultant 
possible (a-b)’s deals to the announced triads containing 6, her card. 
  a-b possible pairs, according to a’s announcement: 
   a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 3; 4; 5 
   a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5 
   a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 2; 4 
   a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3 
Final c’s state of knowledge: After comparing a’s possible deals to the triads including 
6 (056; 146; 236) no new knowledge is gained, so:  
 012a∨034a∨135∨245a. 
 a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3.  Therefore 012a and 543b  
or 
a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5.  Therefore 034a and 125b 
or 
a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2.  Therefore 135a and 042b 
or 
a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3.  Therefore 135a and 042b 
 As the deal has been: C(a)
3
7*C(b)
3
4*C(c)
1
1= aR(
3
7); bR(
3
4); cR(
1
1)=140 deals are 
possible. At the beginning, c knows she holds 6, so now the only possible deals are the 
ones where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 possible deals: C(a)
3
6*C(b)
3
3= aR(
3
6); 
bR(
3
3)=20. However, Cath is only hesitating between four possible deals 
[(012a∧543b)∨(135a∧042b)], thus c knows 16 deals are not possible. If 20 unknown 
deals mean 100% of c’s ignorance, then 4 unknown deals will be 20% of c’s ignorance. 
In this case, Cath has reached knowledge of 80%. In this c cannot reach more 
knowledge because no card is common for all four of a’s possible deals. 
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Total c’s knowledge is 80%  Total c’s ignorance is 20% 
 
  At this point we can consider ourselves ready to deal with the question about the 
‘mute guest’ because, even if we would continue with the rest of the proposed exercises 
by van Distmarch (2008), we think they are no relevant any more, now that we know 
the method, so its application will be similar application every time.  
 
 Thus, is the ‘mute guest’ a true ‘passive’ subject or could he be a ‘disguised 
hacker’? We think the answer is quite clear. In so far as the ‘mute guest’ is really mute 
but not deaf, we cannot be so arrogant as to think the ‘mute guest’ is thinking nothing 
about that he is hearing. We can never asseverate that he is just hearing and not 
listening. If he is listening, he could be thinking about it. If he is thinking he will reach 
some ratio of knowledge. So, a ‘mute guest’ is not a ‘passive’ subject for the fact that he 
is mute, he can be ‘passive’ (hearing and not listening, then not thinking) or not, that is 
his choice, nothing else.  
 Therefore, the chance to have a ‘disguised hacker’ ‘hidden’ as the ‘mute guest’ 
could be quite high because hacker’s performance is just to be ‘hidden’; be ‘mute’ while 
others are talking; listening and not just hearing; keeping information from the others 
during the information exchanges; thinking why is that said and not something else 
and/or in another words, where could be the possible ‘gaps’ (‘gaps’ meaning 
‘information leaks’, the information which is said –including silence- in an unsafe form) 
and then, if ‘gaps’ are found, he could decide to start the attack or not: professional 
attacks are not done at random, they are done with some degree of previous knowledge, 
and knowledge about others is only obtained from themselves. His job is no other than 
to catch the ‘leaking information’ and to take advantage of it in the way to conduct a 
more effective attack. We must be careful, since even when information is passed in a 
safe form, we cannot be sure if some kind of information is being ‘leaked’; information 
is information anyway, even silence is, as already seen at the previous ‘Act’. Thus, a 
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‘mute guest’ is not the best guest when you want to pass information without being 
recorded. 
 
 Anyway, the existence of ‘mute guests’ enhances the argumentative capacities of 
the negotiator, he is required to do his announcements as good as possible (both in 
quality and safety). A ‘mute guest’ could be the best coach for a negotiator. In the next 
chapter we will talk about two relevant lessons learned from the ‘mute guest’, as 
negotiators.  
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Chapter 3.2: Two lessons from the ‘mute guest’ 
 As it has been shown just before, being coached as negotiator in the presence of 
a ‘mute guest’, a ‘potential hacker’, helps us know how and why he is thinking based in 
our announced arguments; therefore we can enhance our way of communicating, 
improve the structure of our announcements –their quality and safety- from the point of 
view of a syntactic Pattern where the content is expressed. A ‘potential hacker’ is the 
best mirror we can have; by observing him we can learn the most about the potential 
‘gaps’ we have in the negotiation we are preparing, because a hacker is nothing but the 
worst opponent.  
 
 The two great lessons from the ‘mute guest’: 
  1. He starts thinking ‘hard’ against us when we directly trespass his ‘true 
zone’ (i.e.: Bill announces: “Cath has card 6”). When anybody feels his ‘true zone’ 
directly trespassed, the natural reaction is to think ‘why does he say that?’ ‘how can he 
know?’. Everybody’s ‘true zone’ is the core of his ‘comfort zone’, and nobody likes it 
to be trespassed, and much less so with a direct allusion. When somebody feels 
overstepped, he feels in jeopardy. Then there are only two possible reactions: either he 
fights against this invasion -and the negotiation process is automatically stopped- or he 
transforms our direct attack into the hardest counterattack we can expect because, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, announcing our opponent’s true is the least safe we 
can do, it is the most revealing we can make, it shows much more our ‘true zone’ than 
talking about our proper true, like Ann did in her announcement. 
  Thus, first lesson: the ‘mute guest’ says: ‘do not touch me, please, or at least 
not shamelessly’. 
 
  2. His second lesson is in correspondence with the previous. Now we know 
that it is not safe to trespass directly our opponent’s ‘true zone’, then how will we be 
able to attack and remain safe. The best plausible way would be to create our replies to 
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the opponent’s announcements following a similar pattern to the one that we would use 
to reply a partner in the presence of a hacker. The question is asking ourselves about 
how could Bill reply Ann and not increase Cath’s already acquired knowledge (from 
Ann’s announcement). The way to do it is just the one we use naturally, when we give 
information not to be understood by a third person: we usually reply repeating the same 
pattern used before, like ‘going along with the same’ -but it is not quite the same- (i.e.: 
Ann announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}”, then Bill’s reply 
could be just the inverse of the part of announcement already ‘caught’ by Cath. Thus, 
Bill’s reply could be: ‘I have one of {345, 543, 056, 042, 146, 236, 013}’). This adds 
nothing to Cath’s knowledge: 
a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3.  Therefore 012a and 543b  
or 
a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5.  Therefore 034a and 125b 
or 
a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2.  Therefore 135a and 042b 
or 
a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3.  Therefore 135a and 042b 
and 
[Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄~Kc(mnpa)˄~Kc(m'n'p'b)] 
          --------------------------- 
                   This is not exactly so, however 
                   Cath has no more knowledge 
       after Ann’s announcement 
      
 We cannot be so naïve as to believe that we will not touch the ‘true 
zone’/‘comfort zone’ of our opponent when we are negotiating. We should not 
undervalue our opponent, and we should prepare the negotiation as if it were a struggle 
against an intelligent hacker; by doing so, we will do the best we will possibly can. 
  
 It is time to check if some more light has been thrown into the darkness. 
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Chapter 3.3: Dialogical Framework Pattern. A light in the darkness 
 As we said in the beginning of this ‘Act’, our aim here is to throw some light 
into the darkness; maybe part of it could be clarified: 
  -  What arguments to choose: we could definitely say that we cannot be 
totally sure about what arguments, in the meaning of their contents, should be chosen 
for a negotiation. However, now we know how to choose the best structure (syntactic 
Pattern) for arguments, since we have learned it from dialogical pattern. 
  - ‘Indirect shadow’, implicit in the subjectivity of our interlocutor: we 
cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments. We cannot predict its content. 
However, in the light of the dialogical pattern we can now predict the most 
plausible/logical syntactic structure for each reply. Thus: 
 If we are in the proposer position, then we will be able to know 
  how the agreement could be, depending on syntactic structure of 
  our first announcement. 
 If we are in the opponent position, the then we will be able to know 
  how the agreement could be, depending on in syntactic structure of 
  the proposer’s first announcement.  
It is definitely better to be the proposer, since he holds the reins of the 
negotiation dialogue. Nevertheless, this is not always the case: when somebody is 
coming to see you, good manners usually require asking him first. For this case 
different negotiation scenarios have to be prepared because, if you are able to guess 
what your opponent will say, you are never sure until he starts the discussion.  
 
 In any case, it is always better to use the most favourable the dialogical 
semantical form for us whenever possible. In this case, we will be choosing our defence 
(structures in green at the table below) and not giving weapons to be attacked with 
(structures in red at the table below). 
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Dialogical semantical form 
 
Announcement 
structure 
 
Attack 
 
Defence 
!α˄β 
The attacker chooses the 
defence 
?L∧ !α 
?R∧ !β 
!α∨β 
The defender chooses the 
defence 
?∨ !α 
!β 
!α→β !α (α is assumed to occur) !β 
!˥α !α ---------------------------- 
!∀xAx ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) !Ak 
!∃xAx ?∃ (could you show me one, please?)        !Ak (k is chosen by the defender) 
!⎕36Aci ?cj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the 
attacker) 
!Acj   
!◊37Aci 
 
?◊ (could you show me a case, please?)   
!Acj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by 
the defender) 
 
 
 As rule it can be said that it is better to make announcements under either a 
disjunctive form, a particular form or a possible form, or a combination of them. 
Moreover, in the particular case of a conditional announcement (when it is not a literal 
expression: no literal antecedent and no literal consequent, understanding ‘literal’ as an 
elementary proposition or its negative form), the best choice is to use: 
 -  the consequent under one of these forms we mentioned just above because 
then we will receive a ‘favourable’ attack, since these are the cases where the defender 
has the choice, and  
 - the antecedent under either an assertion –elementary proposition- a 
conjunctive form, an universal form or a necessary form, or a combination of them 
                                                          
36
 It will be the same in all the cases where there is modal operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, 
temporal or a combination of them.  
37
 Idem. 
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because then we will be able to attack back (once our conditional is attacked) since 
these are the cases where the attacker has the choice.  Finally, it should always be kept 
in mind that negative assertions are automatically interpreted as positive, and they may 
have consequences opposite of what should be expected. Be extremely careful about 
this because no defence is possible after it has been said: the attack will be more than an 
attack, because it has the opposite effect in our mind.  
 
 We have gone deeper in syntax and extracted a pattern to make announcements 
(attacks or defences). Other than that, there is nothing else in a rational framework that 
may throw light into our shadows.  
 
 Through this research we have been able to clarify some dark aspects of the 
negotiation process. Now, in the next section (‘Conclusions’) we will propose a 
protocol to deal with negotiations.  
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CONCLUSIONS: Negotiating with logical-linguistic protocols in a dialogical 
framework 
 In the beginning of this thesis we said that this was an attempt to think how to 
create logical dialogues to tackle negotiations, meaning: solving conflicts from basic 
linguistic structures (conjunctions; disjunctions; conditionals) placed under a dialogue 
form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there is a 
permanent feed-back between both.  
 Thus, time to know if that could be and how to do is arrived. Conclusions will be 
just to show a possible map, guide to choose the order of arguments in negotiations with 
the aim to put in the highest the intersection point between the optimization function 
and satisfaction function. As all negotiations start with a decision, the decision of 
negotiating about something and the rationality of the decision remains on the side of 
the objectivity, that is, in optimization, we will offer in this section a kind of protocol 
that we consider it could be useful to reach that. As a result, the satisfaction will be 
proportionally direct increased and we can reach a high intersection point.  
 
A protocol for negotiating in a ‘dialogical’ framework 
 As it is no possible to negotiate in a no-dialogical framework, here ‘dialogical’ is 
taking in the sense no strictly –although also included- as in logical semantics is taken, 
that is why is written in single quotation marks. We want to remark that without 
dialogue no negotiation process could exist, dialogue is the only form under which a 
negotiation can take place, can be feasible. Therefore, we will offer here a sort of path 
to deal with them. For that we can imagine the different steps that a negotiation could 
traverse before to be sat at the negotiation table, how a right negotiation could be 
prepared: 
 1. To take as much information about the subject (object/s and goal/s) as we are 
able to obtain.  
 2. To analyse each piece of information, even the very small ones. All of them 
are crucial for preparing a right negotiation process. As much we can understand what, 
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how and why is happening better will be the protocol we will are designed to tackle it 
and better the arguments we will choosing to deal with the negotiation. 
 
(Point 1 and 2 are the grounds, better they are done, more solid the negotiation arenas in 
the two directions: to reach success and to analyse it after in order to take lessons for 
futures. In this paper, they are represented in the annex, though it is a completed case, 
because as we already said, future cases cannot possibly prove a hypothesis and we 
needed to test this protocol in order to know its potential for future cases). 
 
 3. To assess if the object/s to negotiate share the same internal structure than the 
objective/s, issue/s in strict correspondence to its/their goal/s (we will done an example 
for its inverse: when we need to negotiate just the price –money- to reach something 
different the more money in itself. In this case issue and its objective do not share the 
same internal structure. On the contrary, it will be sharing the internal structure in the 
case we are negotiating the price –money- for a financial product).  
 4. To evaluate where is the power, if it is very close to the opponents or not.  
 5. To know if the ‘territory’ is quite stable, if we have the control over the 
negotiation time and the space, or they are quite unpredictable. 
 
(If the points 3, 4 and 5 are favourable to us: goal/s share the same internal values than 
the issue/s to negotiate in order to reach it/them; the power is shared or close to us; and 
the arenas are solid enough, then we are available to continue with the path we are 
proposing here. If it is not the case then we will not be able to continue the path we are 
here proposing as it was already showed at page 38). 
 
 6. Taking point 3, 4 and 5 as favourable, it is time to make the whole list of the 
arguments, it means that interlocutor’s arguments are included (definitely, we cannot be 
sure about them, but we need imagine the scenario). At the moment, paying attention 
only to their contents, the structure to be expressed is not relevant yet. For choosing 
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contents will be a great help knowing as better as possible the beliefs and values of our 
interlocutor and trying to discover how to build a common ‘territory’ of beliefs and 
values to make arguments be born there (pages 47-48). Besides, be extremely careful 
with the use of negative sentences (page 45). 
 7. To class the arguments in function of the different aspects which are shared as 
the issue/s as the goal/s. In our case, the 1
st
 Camp David Accords, as an international 
negotiation they are four: political, financial, social and cultural (as it is obvious, that 
shall be adapted for each negotiation type). 
 8. To order inside each selected aspect the classed arguments in function its 
importance from highest to lowest. 
 9. To translate the arguments (countless variables) into Bridge cards (countable 
variables). So, if we decide, for our case, that spades represent the political aspect, then 
the most relevant argument in that will be converted into the As of spades, so on and so 
forth (pages 28-32). 
 10. To play the Bridge game (pages 33-34).  (Here, an objection is coming up, it 
is you could think if some negotiator enjoys this procedure, but he does not know play 
Bridge, he will not able to continue with this protocol. Well, that is not exactly, because 
it exists a computer program which works in the opposite, it chooses the deal and it 
makes the game. At this moment, the algorithm supporting the program is not 
developed to the maximum but it is possible to enhance it because Bridge is just 
mathematics
38
 and a Bridge prototype computer program is already done and it is 
running –you could take a glance over the BBO (Bridge Base Online) website: 
http://www.bridgebase.com/ and to observe how the robot-player works-. So, if the 
algorithm that is working in the opposite is available, it will be also possible it works in 
the other direction. That one option it is not available because for Bridge player that will 
be the antithesis of the game, if you know the result in advance then for what to play. 
                                                          
38
 Cf. E. BOREL & A. CHÉRON, 2009. 
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 11. To analyse what happened during the game (pages 34-35). It means, to do 
the game undo in order to know how the arguments have been played, discovering the 
pairs. That will give a ‘map’ about: what gains, what losses, what does not have a 
correlative argument –in the case one player holds a suit longer than the same suit at the 
other player-. For these, it is much better to disregard no correlative arguments when the 
negotiation takes place, because it is not quite elegant ask somebody for something he 
does not have an answer and also, it is quite ugly to be questioned and to change the 
subject. 
 
(Since point 3 until here, point 11, Act I is its frame. However, as it is clear, we need to 
continue improving this protocol. Subjectivity is too much present inside the chosen 
arguments. We need to increase the quality of the optimization function, leaving as 
much subjectivity as possible to guarantee a good ratio of satisfaction as a result a very 
well optimization done).  
 
 12. It is time to pay attention to the structure (syntax) of the arguments because a 
negotiation is not to place a card against other on a table. A negotiation means dialogue, 
so, countless variables. Once we know our possibilities in terms of ‘gains and losses 
accounting’ we must prepare as maximum each argument that will be used and we 
know that the rational value of true is in syntax (page 43). Therefore the subroutine, 
appearing here, will be like that: 
  12.1. To establish the arguments in pairs, so the result for each trick, 
respecting always the order they have been played. 
  12.2. To be awareness what our mind presupposes in face a conditional 
sentence. For it conditional pattern always presupposes a cause-effect (page 44) where 
if the cause is the case then the effect will also be (page 43). 
  12.3. Be careful and do not touch directly the interlocutor’s ‘true zone’, 
therefore, talk always from our ‘territory of true’. Therefore, if some of the used 
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arguments are touching directly the ‘comfort zone’ of our interlocutor, then will need to 
modify it (page 69).  
  12.4. To rest safe. Our arguments must be as ‘hidden’ as possible, it means 
no pass information not strictly needed. So, saying without to discover our game (page 
69-70). 
  12.5. To create the dialogical form for each argument. As we already know 
the pairs, tricks, we know who works as proponent and who as opponent for each of 
them. Therefore, we are able to create the right dialogical form for each. In any case, it 
could be always highly recommendable, to prepare logic dialogues in the two 
directions, just in case, to be aware. It could be note at this point that we will use harder 
intuitionistic logic because a negotiation is a process, and as a process, negotiators 
remain always engaged in the chain of arguments, thus it is not the best way to look for 
an agreement saying something and to say the opposite later. That is why intuitionistic 
logic will be much more used. Dialogues in a classical logic framework will be reserved 
only for the case that after a chain of reasoning, a negotiator thinks that to change the 
point of view could be better according to the goal reached, and the other negotiator 
agrees. 
 
 Time is arrived: to see the annex again and evaluate the degree of 
accommodation between the previous research and the path proposed along these pages; 
to decide if the attempt to solve conflicts (as objective application) from basic linguistic 
structures (conjunctions; disjunctions; conditionals) placed under a dialogue form as a 
cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there is a permanent 
feed-back between both could be worthy to be put into practice, even to serve peace (as 
a subjective option, since tools do not have an ethical value in themselves). 
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 Lastly, we would want to indicate some possible research to continue this 
approach to deal with negotiations. Open ways could be: 
 -  A dialogical analysis for intra-negotiations (inside the same time), because 
here we are only considered the inter-negotiations. This approach is already taken in 
account for ourselves with the hope to may start it soon. 
 -  A Hintikka’s GTS approach for inter-negotiations and for intra-negotiations 
as well. 
 - Computer research: algorithms applied to make easy and quick building 
dialogues into their dialogical form also for the ‘hacker’ dialogue, probably the most 
interesting to do in order to get ready in front of possible attacks.  
 - Philosophical implications and imbrications to tackle negotiation with 
logical-linguistic protocols in a dialogical framework. 
 
Thank you for reading. 
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ANNEX:  
STUDY CASE: 1
ST
 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
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39
 A published presentation by M.D. MARTÍNEZ (2012) is also available about this subject. 
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 As it was said at the beginning of this thesis, the 1
st
 Camp David Accords has 
been the study case chosen to apply our research. It was the preliminary task.  
 Our conclusions about how to establish a protocol to find out the best order to 
use the arguments during a negotiation process had to be proven right or wrong. We 
needed a ‘territory’ where they could be verified. That is why we chose a completed 
negotiation case to guarantee an objective application, because there is no possibility to 
alter the events. The document in the annex should help be assess this research in terms 
of right or wrong, because the ‘semantical true’ would be otherwise unknown.  
 
 To remain faithful and preserve the rigour and the aseptic nature of this research 
we do not apply any framework that will be applied later, so you will not find any 
application of the Game Theory, neither NLP nor dialogical semantics used across this 
analysis of the 1
st
 Camp David Accords. 
 
 This negotiation analysis investigates ‘why were these the agreements reached 
and not others?’ because, in fact, this is the only data we really know. To answer this 
question it will be necessary to analyse each piece of information, even the very small 
ones. All of them are crucial for the negotiation analysis. When we can understand what 
happened and why, then, and only then, we can be sure we have a solid ‘territory’ to test 
our conclusions. Therefore, this document is a proper research work in itself. Such was 
the case that as said in footnote 8, page 10, it contains its own bibliography section, 
where you can find specific sources together with other already referred to in the 
previous bibliography section; these ones are shared sources for both research 
approaches.
 
  
 Lastly, we would like to warn the reader that all the underlined text and/or bold 
text is meant to facilitate the reading of this document, as it is quite long. 
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It was on that occasion that the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, 
saying:  
To your descendants I give this land,  
from the Wadi of Egypt to the Great River [Euphrates]  
Genesis 15, 18
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 USCCB, The New American Bible. Translated by Members of the Catholic Biblical Association of 
America. Encino (California), Benziger Editor, 1970, p.21. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This paper has been written thinking of all the people who love logical games, 
because talking about an international negotiation is keeping in the scene the different 
elements involved along the study case and finding their relationships. 
 A paper which tries to analyse an international negotiation must give an answer 
to the question ‘Why were the agreements these, and not others?’ In our specific case, 
the Fist Camp David, the concrete question could be ‘Why came the Sinai back to Egypt 
and not the other territories conquered during the ’67 War?’ since this was the direct 
consequence of the Camp David Accords (Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Washington, 
March 26, 1979). Knowing and understanding that is the only possibility to understand 
the History. When History is understood, then, and only then, it is possible to discuss it. 
And when we discuss History we are making History. The only aim of analysing an 
international negotiation is to learn the lessons on which History is daily built. In order 
to achieve that we need to redo the ‘puzzle’ of the case from the only part that is really 
known: the final agreement. 
 In the following pages we will try to revive the negotiation held during 
thirteen days in September 1978 in Camp David, between Israel and Egypt, with the 
mediation of the US. Therefore, we suggest you to forget the known agreements and to 
start looking for the pieces involved. 
 Let us start this paper with the key pieces (OCEAN). First will be to answer 
these questions: 
- Which is the Object of the negotiation? 
- Which is the Context of the negotiation? 
- Which are the Elements of the negotiation? 
- How is the Asymmetrical relationship of power between the different teams 
involved? 
- Who and how are the Negotiators (including the mediator, in this case)? 
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 Second, we relate these pieces to each other. Our game is started, we have the 
pieces and now we begin assembling them. To build this will be necessary wondering 
about the threads which weave together the Object with the Context with the Elements 
with the Asymmetrical relationship of power and with the Negotiators. Now we need to 
answer the following questions: 
- Which is the structure of the negotiation? 
- The matter of the cultural differences, are they present or not? 
- How is the relationship between the different actors involved? 
- Which is the strategy deployed? 
- How is the process? 
 Once the different pieces and their relationships have been addressed, our 
‘puzzle’ seems finished, but is it really finished? This is the moment to remember the 
agreement forgotten in the former page and try to fit it in our ‘puzzle’, or decide to skip 
it. The tighter the pieces the more masterly the lesson learned, which will be used to 
continue building History along future new negotiations. 
  
 To deal with the questions arisen before, we would normally use specific 
sources, that is, the official documents of 1
st
 Camp David and the manuals about it or 
about the international negotiations; the huge amount of literature available –not all of it 
rigorous- makes it impossible to handle within the scope of this paper. Giving our 
‘puzzle’ a logical form required narrowing down the documents from ordinary press 
sources, as they are usually not specialized. Since the negotiations were held in the most 
complete privacy, this work has developed starting from the declassified sources, 
authorized sources and specialized manuals. As with every choice, there are advantages 
-working with the most accurate sources-, but also disadvantages –skipping the opinions 
of the world about what happened in Camp David-. ‘What is more real, what the world 
thinks and believes or what the documents say?’ People would probably say general 
opinion is more real; however, we believe that working starting from the direct sources 
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is better to learn how the negotiation was handled. Another disadvantage of working 
from the original documents is that not all declassified sources are easily available, e.g.: 
obtaining the Briefings to prepare The Camp David Accords included in the Annex. 
Another problem was to contrast with experts the conclusion to our hypothesis (‘Why 
came the Sinai back to Egypt and not the others territories conquered during the ’67 
war?’), because authorized and declassified sources explain what happened, but not 
WHY -or not so clearly-. Showing the true reasons for the agreement requires us to be 
logical, to look thoroughly through every piece and to contrast the ‘findings’. 
 
 We invite you in the next pages to look through the different pieces of the 
negotiation proposed, and to build your personal puzzle with them. Our puzzle and our 
conclusion, although well founded, are not the only possible true. This work aims to be 
just a very modest contribution to the search of key elements that help analyse 
international negotiations.  
 
 Please enjoy the paper and remember that the only possible glue for the puzzle 
pieces is Logic. Good luck in this ‘logical game’!! 
 
KEY PIECES (OCEAN) 
 In this chapter we will analyse the key pieces of our ‘puzzle’. Which are they? 
They are the ones proposed at the introduction of this paper: the Object, the Context, 
the Elements, the Asymmetrical power and the Negotiators involved (including the 
mediator) for this study case (1
st
 Camp David). So, we will follow this order; but it has 
to be remembered at all times that the order proposed is not an order of importance, it is 
only an order to put forward the pieces involved, as a framework for our work: building 
the ‘puzzle’ of Camp David Accords. This is why the following questions/pieces will be 
introduced whit a dash and not with a number. 
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- Which is the Object of the negotiation? 
 It has to be stated first that the object of a negotiation is not the objective/goal of 
the negotiation. The goal is always to find an agreement and the object is the matter that 
we want (more or less willingly) to negotiate. 
 Our object to negotiate is the sovereignty of the territories occupied by Israel 
during the 1967 War, because this is the main motive for the lack of peace in the Middle 
East. This peace between Israel and the Arab Countries, more specifically, the peace 
between Israel and Egypt is our true objective, because after the 1967 War the true 
peace never came, the conflict became permanent in a higher or lower degree, and the 
situation in the Middle East is more unstable every day. The world ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ 
peace in this region, and the region ‘needs’ it too. Eleven years after the 1967 War the 
Middle East and the Occidental World wished to set the UN SC RES 242 and 338, but 
each party according to their own interests.  
 
 Let’s see now where are the key points of this object; therefore we will look at 
the essential paragraph in those two Resolutions of the UN Security Council, which 
involve controversial points: 
UN SC RES 242 (November 22, 1967) 
 “1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of 
a just lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
 2.  Affirms further the necessity 
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(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in 
the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and the political independence 
of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones;”41 
UN SC RES 338 (22 of October 1973) 
 “2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire 
the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (197) in all of its parts; 
  3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with cease-fire, negotiations 
shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at 
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”42 
 Israel and Egypt will be sitting to negotiate the sovereignty on the territories 
occupied by Israel during the 1967 War to consolidate the peace in the Middle East, but 
the controversial point -“(...) from territories occupied in the recent conflict (...)”43- 
will be the ‘sting’ at the before sentence, which are “from territories occupied” Does 
this mean all territories occupied? or will this sentence be fulfilled if the resolution is 
applied to just one territory?  
 
 For the moment, we agree that the Object is negotiating the sovereignty of the 
territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War, without going into discussing 
what is the true meaning of “from”. 
                                                          
41
 UN SC RES 242 (1967) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm 
Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. 
42
 UN SC RES 338 (1973) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm 
Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. 
43
 UN SC RES 242 (1967) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm 
Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. 
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- Which is the Context of the negotiation? 
 The context of the negotiation is a regional context, but as the region is the 
Middle East, region of paramount importance in the world because of its position: 
capital geographic position (gravity centre between Orient and Occident), capital 
geopolitical position (directly deriving from the former), capital geological position 
(because of the riches in its subsoil) and capital geo-economical (consequence of the 
geological wealth). Anything that happens there will be transcendent to the rest of the 
world. Therefore, our context is at the same time regional and international.  
 We need to remember that the negotiation occurs in the Cold War era context. 
The support given by the USSR to the Arab States directly involved in this conflict 
has been clear and evident since the 1967 War, while the US gave support to Israel. 
 The tension grew higher after the last war, Yom Kippur War (October 1973), 
and the risk of a new world war increased. The conflict won a true international 
dimension. The decision of the US to mediate in favour of an accord between the 
parties involved, specifically between the more powerful parties on the region (Israel 
and Egypt), is a strategic and diplomatic decision: on the one hand, the US makes an 
attempt to pacify the region, being peace the best guarantee to assure control of the 
region and its economics resources; on the other hand, as the US volunteered as 
mediator, it appears in front of the world as a saviour of the world and not as a threat to 
its rival, the USSR. Moreover, the US appears in front of the parties (Israel and Egypt) 
as a potential true mediator, in spite of its interests and preferences, but also as the true 
power in the world -in the ‘70s the USSR power was already in decadence-. 
 
- Which are the Elements of the negotiation? 
 The elements of the negotiation are not always really true, but their importance 
is that they are true inside the mind which believes in them. What are the elements 
inside the minds of our negotiators, including our mediator? Answering this question is 
really difficult because nobody can be into anybody’s mind. In this sense, any answer 
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will be a little bit daring. Nevertheless, we’ll try to give a possible answer, based on the 
background of knowledge that we have about the conflict being negotiated. 
 So, we can think that the elements involved are: 
- To Israel: Preserving the territories occupied during the 1967 War and 
consolidating its presence and its power in the world. The territories 
occupied are at the same time a physical thing and a psychological thing with 
all elements that the psychological things entail (in terms of power and 
cultural presence). 
- To Egypt: Recovering the territories occupied during the 1967 War, and 
with that, raising its power in the Middle East; physical power, because this 
means that Egypt will become a powerful State in the Middle East -because 
it would be the only state that could have won something from Israel, so 
much as recovering the control on the two banks of the Suez Canal-.  
- To the US: To the US the element ‘territories occupied’ is a very good 
pretext, the true element to get involved in the negotiation being its need 
to ensure peace in the area. The US has great economic, strategical and 
political interests there: on the one hand, the control of the USSR power, 
and on the other hand to secure the supply for raw materials to cover its 
needs. 
 
- How is the Asymmetrical relationship of power between the different teams 
involved? 
 Who the mediator is, determined the degree of power asymmetry in this 
negotiation. 
 In the context of a bipolar world (Cold War era -US vs. USSR-), in which each 
of the parties (Israel and Egypt) is supported by one of the power blocks (US and 
USSR), the power balance shifts toward one side from the beginning, even if it is only a 
psychological effect, by the fact of the US being the ‘third’ negotiating party (the 
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mediator). Moreover, playing at home is always an advantage, and here the negotiation 
takes place in the US. So, it could be said that Israel starts off as a favourite, since 
the mediator happens to be Israel’s own protector. However, the US mediation will 
aim to protect first the US own interests in the Middle East. It is the US who has de 
facto the power balance in its hands, no wonder they volunteered as mediators, so 
much for the need to warrant its interests as for the ability to show-off muscle –we are 
at the end of the ‘70s, still in the Cold War era period, ad the power of the USSR starts 
showing the large internal fissures that took the USSR to crumbling down a decade later 
(1989)-. 
 
- Who and how are the Negotiators (including the mediator, in this case)? 
 Negotiators are the key piece, they are the subjects of negotiation, therefore 
they hold the negotiation together. Until now we have looked at the invariable 
keys, which are independent of the negotiator dealing with them. However, their 
‘value’ changes according to the subject who negotiates with them, thus they might 
increase or diminish their worth. Negotiators are the ‘active’ part in negotiation, 
and they will provide ‘revenue’ or ‘losses’ in the course of negotiation. 
 Let’s review the main features of the profile of each one of our subjects, in order 
to understand how our pieces shall be held together. Those features can be found in the 
personal history that we know of each one of the subjects: 
- Menachem Begin for Israel: Polish origin (Brest, August 16, 1913). 
Attached to the Zionist movement in Poland since 12 years of age. Law 
Degree in 1935 at the Warsaw University. Outstanding student because of 
his rhetoric and oratory abilities. After the Nazis invasion of Poland he is 
captured in his flee by the Soviets and is deported to a labour camp in 
Siberia. After liberation and having lost his family during Holocaust, he 
moves to Palestine while serving with the British army as an interpreter. He 
takes advantage of this position to actively collaborate in overthrowing 
British power from Palestine and in the illegal immigration of Jews. After 
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proclamation of the State of Israel he remains very active in the most 
conservative wing of Judaism, reaching leadership of the Likud bloc (Jewish 
right party) in 1977. He was the first Israeli Prime Minister to name the 
Jordan River territories, including the West Bank, using their biblical names 
(Judea and Samaria). He was also the first Israeli Prime Minister to set foot 
on Egypt (Ismailia, December 25, 1977), in correspondance to the visit of 
Sadat, President of Egypt, to Jerusalem one month earlier (November 1977). 
 From the former data we can infer that Begin’s personality will be of the 
 “Extraversion—being sociable, assertive, talkative”44 type. 
- Anwar el-Sadat for Egypt: Born in Egypt (December 25, 1918), he went to 
a British military school in Egypt, however his aim was to overthrow British 
power from his homeland. After graduating he goes in search of Nasser, and 
together they start gathering a revolutionary group of military officials. After 
being in prison for revolutionary activities and for actively collaborating in 
King Farouk’s deposition –a puppet of the British power-, he finally reaches 
power in the neibourhood of Nasser –eventually becoming his confidence 
man-. He was Vicepresident since 1969 to Nasser’s death in 1970; Sadat 
takes then office as President of Egypt. After their defeat in the Yom Kippur 
War in 1973 and the urgent state of need of the country, Sadat reoriented his 
Foreign Policy addressing its force towards the Arab League and the fight 
against the State of Israel seems unwise under the circumstances: their 
backing power, the USSR is showing increasing signs of decadence; Egypt is 
going throug a period of need after the two defeats in front of Israel. This 
situation requires accepting the US help and starting to look towards the 
West in a more open manner, fighting out suspicion. On November 1977 
Sadat, invited by the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, visits Jerusalem with the 
aim of starting a peace process in the Middle East. 
                                                          
44
 Barrick and Mount, 1991. Quoted in: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, Essentials of 
Negotiation. New York, McGraw-Hill, 2004, p. 429. 
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 From the former data we can infer that Sadat’s personality will be of the 
 “Conscientiousness—being responsible, organized, achievement 
 oriented”45 type. 
- Jimmy Carter for the US (mediator): Born and raised in the State of 
Georgia (October 1, 1924), in the South East of the US. The son of farmers 
and active Christian Baptist througout his life. He got a degree in Science 
and was a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, adscribed to 
submarine missions. He started his political career on the late ’50s. He 
became President of the US for the Democrat party on January 20, 1977. 
Among the priorities for his term was the creation of the Departament of 
Energy Organization and the Energy Security ‘Act’46. He signed a new anti-
ballistic agreement with the USSR (SALT II. Vienna, 1979). He also 
established diplomatic relations between the US and the Popular Republic of 
China.  
 From the former data we can infer that Carter’s personality will be of the 
 “Agreeableness—being flexible, cooperative, trusting”47 type. 
 
 Once our key pieces have been analysed, in the view of the personalities of 
the actors in the play, we may start thinking that the negotiation will take place 
within the tension between competing and collaborating, but with a clear trend 
towards competing. Carter’s tough work throughout the negotiations is to conduct 
such tension toward a result of compromising. In fact, Carter is aware of the strong 
need for compromising in the Briefings to prepare The Camp David Accords: 
 “-- Both master manipulators, utilizing basically two different personality styles 
in order to achieve power and control. Begin concentrates on tactics and details, broad 
                                                          
45
 Ibidem. 
46
 Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/keylegis.phtml Authorized website of 
Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 
47
 Barrick and Mount, 1991. Quoted in: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 429. 
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dramatic gestures. In each case, this allows them to avoid making hard decisions. The 
intermediary trying to bring Sadat the conceptualist and Begin the Talmudic scholar 
together will have to move each man away from his preferred political (and 
psychological) style. 
 -- In dealing with Begin, avoid entering into word definitions. Allow him to make 
his basic point without interference and then point him to the intended objective. 
Begin’s concentration on detail is basically an evasive, controlling technique which can 
be overcome by summarizing succinctly his point of view and then redirecting him back 
to the mainstream of the discussions. 
 In contrast, Sadat will need more guidance, direction, and limit-setting. Left 
alone, he may get involved in ambiguities and generalities. The President can take 
advantage of this style by summarizing Sadat’s basic intent in such a way that it 
appears that there are greater points of agreement with Begin than would otherwise be 
the case.”48 
 
 Now we have the puzzle pieces, and now we can foresee the degree of 
assertiveness↔competitivineness in which the relationships among the pieces will 
proceed. This is the time to go one step forward: towards a more thorough analysis of 
the relationships among those pieces. 
 
THE THREADS THAT WEAVE TOGETHER THE KEY PIECES 
 Our pieces, impersonated by our two main characters Begin and Sadat, need to 
reach BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) in order to assemble 
nicely; however, in sight of the two personalities, the start point is a bargaining 
situation. How to change it into a win-win situation will require a long development. 
Let’s now analyse the different elements that compose the path to BATNA. 
                                                          
48
 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 4: “Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings”, p. 3.  
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 As happened with the order of introduction of the key pieces, the elements of the 
negotiation that will be introduced hereafter will not be presented following an order of 
importance, because all of them have a part in the assembling of our puzzle. This is why 
the following questions/pieces will be introduced whit a dash and not with a number. 
 
- Which is the structure of the negotiation? 
 Analysing the structure of a negotiation gives us, as W. Zartman puts it, “a 
skeleton key”49 in order to understand how our pieces moved and reached their final 
relationship; we could say that the structure is the scaffold where we can walk, while 
always keeping in mind the flexibility limits of such a structure.  
 In our case, we have a triangular scaffold, each one of our actors (Negotiators) in 
a vertex. Begin and Sadat are in the base vertices, whereas Carter is in the apex. This 
triangle is circumscribed by the circle of Context. The triangle sides are the Elements to 
be negotiated; the angular tension will be given by the degree of power Asymmetry; in 
this case there will be some tilt in favour of Israel and the US, as we have seen before, 
creating two angles of <60º, whereas Egypt angle will be >60º. The area inscribed in the 
triangle will be the Object of negotiation. 
 We have already described our scaffold/skeleton. For the moment, this is an 
inert shape, it is what is given. How to go from static to dynamic, from the bargaining 
attitude to a possible win-win attitude, this will be the task of the mediator. Carter has to 
find the ‘integral function’ of the vectors that are present in the triangle, concentrate 
them in their incenter, and thus achieve the Objective of the negotiation. 
 So, we are in front of a circumscribed triangle shape that will be forced in an 
attempt of changing it into a point structure circumscribed by a Context that will have 
been modified by the direct action of the integration of the triangle in a point. The 
change from one scaffold shape to the other will be determined by the answer to the 
                                                          
49
 I. William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, 
Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991,   
p. 65. 
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following four questions: the underlying cultures, the relationship/behaviour between 
the actors, the unfolded strategy and the process implied. The strategy will be 
determined by the relationship between the actors, and it will undoubtedly be influenced 
by the deepest cultural roots in each of them; in the deepest, human beings make 
decisions based in their beliefs –not only religious- but the deepest, more transcendent 
beliefs.  
  
 Now we inquire about the cultural background of each actor, so to 
understand later their mutual relationships, and further the strategy that each of 
them will display during the process. Finally, the analysis of the process will 
provide us a global vision of what happened and why. We can obtain the formula 
(the function of the integral defining the convergence area –incenter-, however not 
completely perfect, because that is how integrals are, since the differential 
coefficient has to be ideally 0, or as near as possible; anyway, our function is 
nothing but the mathematical expression of BATNA). 
 
- The matter of the cultural differences, are they present or not? 
 An evident answer is YES, our actors come from different cultures: Begin 
from Judaism, Sadat from Muslim and Carter from Christian culture. But the three of 
them share one point: all three are compromised with the religion of their culture. This 
is their common point; therefore, here is where we base the function that we want to 
start building. 
 We should take into account that the cultural value will be stronger in 
Begin and Sadat than in Carter, because in the Jewish and Muslim cultures there 
is only a narrow separation between religious and political power. The fact that 
Carter shares with the others the worth of religion makes him a suitable mediator, 
since he knows the keys with which religion can re-ligate people. To find a meeting 
point among these apparently dissimilar cultures will be Carter’s heavy task: “(...) 
At points of resistance, the President may remind them that they already share 
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objectives in common. The Summit meetings are a means of discovering those points 
of similarity. The objective is to minimize their real differences and maximize their 
apparent similarities.”50 
 The point that would minimize their real differences and maximize their 
apparent similarities is to be found in their deepest, in the main root of all that 
they believe; only by knowing this can a strategy be designed and a process 
understood -especially in this case, in which the Object are the lands/boundaries 
between states with different cultures-: “(...) This is an especially challenging 
(negotiation) because cross-cultural and international negotiations add a level of 
complexity significantly greater than within-culture negotiations. (...). 
(...) This complexity is a source of frustration for many cross-cultural negotiators, 
who would like clearer practical guidance when negotiating across borders.”51  
 Zartman states that: “Culture is indeed relevant to the understanding of the 
negotiation process—every bit as relevant as breakfast and too much the same extent. 
Like the particular type of breakfast the negotiators ate, culture is cited primarily for its 
negative effects. Yet even the best understanding of any such effect is tautological, its 
measure vague, and its role in the process basically epiphenomenal.”52 Let’s use the 
New Encyclopædia Britannica definition: “Culture, the integrate pattern of human 
Knowledge, belief and behaviour. Culture thus defined consists of language, ideas, 
beliefs, customs, taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, 
ceremonies and other related components; and the development of culture depends 
                                                          
50
 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 4: “Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings”, p. 1.  
51
 R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 443. 
52
 I. William Zartman, “A Skeptic’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of Water 
Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 17. 
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upon man’s capacity to learn and to transmit knowledge to succeeding generations. 
(1990, Vol.3, p. 784)”53 
 In the present case, culture (religion, in a more generic sense) is what 
provides a “(...) bridge between the two sides (...)”54 Thus, this will be our start 
point, this is, the symbol of the integral function will be defined by the experience 
of the religious fact, ant this will enshrine and specifically characterize our 
function. Now it is time to reconsider the function itself and its properties –as a set 
of several elements: the actors-, the relationship among its elements (‘reflexive’, 
‘symmetric’ and ‘transitive’), seeing them as elements constituting one ensemble. 
 
- How is the relationship between the different actors involved? 
 Asking this brings up directly the question the behaviour that our actors 
will show and their interactions. The question is really about the ‘reflexive 
property’ of our function, because the insulation imposed on the negotiators has 
them in a closed system in which their only relationship is with each other. Their 
personalities and beliefs –in a wide sense- define their relationships toward 
themselves. 
 Thus we can expect a relationship that will be falling on itself, dotted by the 
reiterative rhythm of religious fundamentalism between Begin and Sadat, giving 
their relationship a marked authoritarian character, accompanied by the peal of 
unmatched notes, Carter, who, understanding this fundamentalism, can fall on it, 
ringing, aiming at cracking it in order to open a gate to integrative dialogue, 
breaking the distributive rhythm that the others intend to set. With this aim in 
mind Carter sets the pace of the meetings reaffirming whatever links the 
                                                          
53
 Quoted by Winfried Lang, “A Professional’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of 
Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 38. 
54
 Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Implications for Practitioners”. In: Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of 
Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 204. 
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negotiators and eluding or postponing whatever divides them: “The pivotal issue in 
the talks will be Israel’s need to know whether they can get an agreement on the Sinai 
and what price they must pay for it in concessions on the West Bank. You will want to 
clarify with Sadat in your opening session that the prospect of an agreement there 
will the major incentive for Israel. The more precise he can be about a final, if 
phased, agreement there the more he can seek in the West Bank/Gaza in return.”55 
 
- Which is the strategy deployed? 
 Once we know the nature (culture/religion) that will determine the 
‘reflexive’ relationship, we want to know about its expression beyond its 
relationship with itself. This is, we want to know about the strategies the actors are 
going to put beside their actions. Every cause inevitably produces a feed-back 
effect. Thus, analyzing the strategy developed in a negotiation will be analyzing the 
‘symmetric property’ of the elements in our function. 
 The strategy is just the actors’ estimation about how they will proceed. It is 
determined by the personality of each of them and by the goals they wish to obtain as 
result of the negotiation process. So, our strategy will be more or less effective 
depending on the self-control we can exert when expressing our personality, and on the 
definition of our goals: “Effective goals must be concrete, specific, and measurable. The 
less concrete and measurable our goals are, the harder it is to (a) communicate to the 
other party what we want, (b) understand what the other party wants, and (c) determine 
whether an offer on the table satisfies our goals. (....)”56. The strategy is the frame in 
which the negotiation process will develop. The choice of certain tactics to implement 
the planned strategy may also have an effect in the final outcome of the negotiation: 
“(...) Although the line between strategy and tactics may seem fuzzy, one major 
difference is that of scale, or immediacy (Quinn, 1991). Tactics are short-term, adaptive 
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 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 1: “An Overview of the Camp David Talks”, p. 2.  
56
 R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 109. 
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moves designed to enact or pursue broad (or higher-level) strategies, which in turn 
provide stability, continuity, and direction for tactical behaviours.”57 
 In our case we can infer that, in the beginning, cause↔effect relationships 
will be marked by competition. Begin and Sadat both want peace in the Middle 
East, but their disposition to collaboration is weak. Their strategy will be to try to 
get as much as possible from their opponent while yielding nothing or as little as 
possible of their own. Carter’s strategy will be to gently bring them to a position 
closer to integration-collaboration. Apparently, Carter works from an 
accommodation plane; thus he prioritizes a good relational outcome over good 
substantive outcomes, thus securing their very existence. This strategy looks for 
points of deep connection, in order to build on them an agreement over the 
differences: “(...) The objective is to minimize their real differences and maximize 
their apparent similarities.”58  
 The mediator’s strategy is necessary to gradually turn the symmetrical 
cause↔effect relationship between the negotiators into a more constructive, less 
destructive one. Finally reaching BATNA will be, if not an absolute collaboration at 
least a bargaining mix because for a constructive relationship “(...) agreement is 
necessary on several issues: the price, the closing date of (...), renovations to (...)”59 
 
- How is the process? 
 The negotiation process can be summarized as the development of the ‘transitive 
property’, since the implementation of the strategy creates not only a ‘symmetry’ 
relationship, determined by the feed-back of the cause↔effect relationship, but also a 
yet unaccounted for effect produced by our tactical acts, a sort of ‘third party’. 
                                                          
57
 Ibidem, p.110-111. 
58
 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 4: “Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings”, p. 1.  
59
 R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 38. 
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 Therefore, the process leading to accomplish some type of agreements,  of a 
greater or lesser extent, in accordance with our goals, depends largely on the process 
development and its effects on all the participating actors.  
 Taking all that into account, together with the negotiation timing, let’s now 
analyse each one of its phases
60
: 
- Phase 1: Preparation: (February 14, 1977 to September 5, 1978). On 
February 14, Carter takes the initiative of writing letters to Sadat and Rabin 
(Israeli Prime Minister at the time), at the request of his State Secretary -C. 
Vance- at his return from a mission in the Middle East, urging them to start 
peace negotiations for the area: “(...) I look forward to meeting whit you 
personally at the earliest opportunity. I have asked Secretary Vance to 
discuss when and how our first meeting might be arranged. In view of the 
importance of Egypt in our common pursuit of peace (...). The growing 
friendship and cooperation between Egypt and the United States have 
already brought us some steps along the path to peace”61 “I am confident 
that US-Israeli relations will continue on the cordial and sound basis that 
has characterized the close ties between our countries and peoples for three 
decades. I look forward to working closely whit you in our common search 
for a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.”62 From that day to the 
                                                          
60
 We take up the phases as they are proposed on page 117, figure 4.3. In: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & 
David Saunders, opus cit. 
61
 Document 1: Letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. It was written 
during the first month of President Carter’s administration. Document declassified on October 3, 1997. 
In: The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty-
Five Years”. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents.phtml Authorized 
website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 
62
 Document 2: Letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. It was written 
during the first month of President Carter’s administration. Document declassified on December 11, 
1998. In: The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents After 
Twenty-Five Years”. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents.phtml Authorized 
website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 
     
NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS  
in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK                                                                         
 
  
MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors                       
 
 
114 
 
start of the negotiations in Camp David (September 6, 1978) the countries 
involved prepared the negotiation meticulously, since the interests at stake 
were of paramount importance to each one of them, as we have seen already.  
- Phase 2: Relationship building: The relationships between our actors have 
been modelled during the Preparation Phase. We should remark here that 
the position of the US is that of an impartial mediator. For this, Carter has a 
private meeting with each of the other two negotiators in the morning of 
September 6, with the aim to create an atmosphere of confidence during the 
negotiations: “(...) seeking to build a common recognition of the unique 
opportunity these talks offer, the responsibility to history the three of them 
share, and the need to grasp the nettle now. He could emphasize that the 
negotiations have reached a stage where only heads of government can 
break the impasse, and therefore each side must try understand the other’s 
political problems. (...)  Since each side will have as an objective capturing 
the US, the President with sympathy for each side’s interests will have to 
establish the independence of the US position. Each will want a sense of 
special relationship with us; we will want to be close to each without being 
in either’s pocket. (...)”63 
- Phase 3: Information gathering: This is the time when all the actors meet to 
explain to each other what has brought them to this gathering and what do 
they expect to get from it. This meeting took place in the afternoon of 
September 6: “Later in the day, the three men used the patio outside Aspen 
for further discussions. They talked about three issues: 1) the Sinai 
Peninsula between Egypt and Israel, 2) the ownership of the West Bank and 
Gaza areas bordering Israel, and 3) the role that Palestinian people would 
have in governing themselves.”64 
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 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 2: “A scenario for Camp David”, p. 2.  
64
 September 6. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml 
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- Phase 4: Information using: Here our actors will express themselves with 
regard to the way in which an agreement will be possible about the three 
points exposed in the former phase. Along this phase the 
constraints/preferences for an eventual agreement will become apparent. 
This is the hardest part of the negotiation: the subjects to be discussed affect 
Sadat and Begin directly: sovereignty, security and economy (the three 
pillars of all foreign policy), with the aggravating circumstance of having to 
talk about Jerusalem, a holy city for Jews and Muslims, and a necessary 
subject when discussing the territories occupied during the 1967 War. This 
phase started in the morning of Thursday September 7, and was finished by 
Carter in the night of Tuesday September 12 when, in view of the sterility of 
endless discussions, he decides to assertively intervene by choosing the less 
problematic issue, the Sinai, to set a framework  for an agreement: “I 
decided to work that afternoon on the terms for an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, 
and spread the Sinai maps out on the dining table to begin this task, writing 
the proposed agreement on a yellow scratch pad."--Jimmy Carter from 
Keeping Faith
65
 
- Phase 5: Bidding: This is the most difficult time of the negotiation. The 
positions of Sadat and Begin seem irreconcilable and Carter fears not to 
reach an agreement. But peace in the Middle East is crucial for the US 
interests and Carter decides to ‘impose’ peace in the region: “Determined to 
reach agreement on a framework for peace, Carter and Vance spent eleven 
hours with Aharon Barak from Israel and Osama el-Baz from Egypt to work 
out the detailed language of the framework proposal. As they hammered out 
the language of each phrase, both Barak and el-Baz demonstrated their 
astute legal minds and their excellent knowledge of English. When 
differences in language stopped progress, President Carter suggested that 
                                                          
65
 September 12. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml 
Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency for the Camp David Accords.                                            
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"West Bank" be used in the English and Arabic texts, while "Judea and 
Samaria" be used in the Hebrew version; "Palestinians" in the English and 
Arabic, yet "Palestinian Arabs" in the Hebrew. He would explain the change 
in a letter to Begin. The letter would be attached to any formal agreement 
they would reach. The letter exchange idea became a critical factor in 
making progress toward agreement.”66 In spite of Carter’s efforts, the 
negotiation is in a deadlock of bargaining-bargaining: “We can go no 
further.”- Carter.  
“I am leaving.”- Sadat. 
President Sadat could not agree to leave Israeli settlements and airfields in 
the Sinai Peninsula, and Prime Minister Begin could not agree to remove 
these settlements. Without agreement on these issues, there did not appear to 
be any way to continue. Carter had already told the delegations that Sunday, 
September 17, would be the last day of the meetings. He had requested that 
all the delegations work on a joint statement about the meetings, emphasizing 
the positive accomplishments.”67 In this critical situation, and with only 48 
hours left, Carter plays his only winning trick reminding Egypt of the 
importance of collaborating with Israel and changing their own attitude in 
order to reach a peace agreement, since future Egypt-US relationships depend 
on this: "I explained to [Sadat] the extremely serious consequences... that his 
action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he 
would be violating his personal promise to me... [and] damage one of my 
most precious possessions-- his friendship and our mutual trust." --Jimmy 
Carter from Keeping Faith
68
. Next morning he addressed Begin’s iron 
position: “Ultimatum, Excessive Demands, Suicide”-Begin. 
                                                          
66
 September 13. Ibidem. 
67
 September 15. Ibidem.                                                                 
68
 September 15. Source on line:                                                     
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml 
Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency for the Camp David Accords. 
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Even though the progress of the talks was faltering, Carter's determination to 
reach agreement remained strong. In another negotiating session with Begin, 
Barak, and Dayan, Carter and Vance made a case for peace, going through 
the Sinai framework and the Framework for Peace line by line.”69 
- Phase 6: Closing de deal: Carter’s words to Sadat had an effect as expected, 
and next day -September 16- a safe path was tended toward the peace 
agreement: “Carter explained to Begin that Sadat would not continue 
negotiations toward a peace treaty until the Israeli settlements in the Sinai 
region were removed. After a storm of protest, Begin finally agreed to submit 
the question of settlements to the Israeli Knesset for a decision--If any 
agreement is reached on all other Sinai issues, will all the settlers be 
withdrawn? He even promised to allow each Knesset and Cabinet member to 
vote individually, without the requirements of political party loyalty. This 
was acceptable to Sadat! 
Carter explained to Sadat that Begin would not allow the phrase 
"inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" to be part of the 
Framework for Peace. [1967 U.N. Resolution 242, which contains this 
phrase, is to be found in the annex of the Framework. Begin claimed that it 
did not apply to Israel because the 1967 War was a defensive war for his 
country.] Begin insisted that only permanent residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza areas, not all Palestinians, participate in future peace negotiations. 
Sadat agreed to write one letter defining Egypt's role in these negotiations 
and one letter stating his position on an undivided Jerusalem. This was 
acceptable to Begin!  
All through the meetings, Carter continued to remind Sadat and Begin how 
much each had to gain in making peace.”70  
 
                                                          
69
 September 16. Ibidem. 
70
 September 16. Ibidem. 
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 In the end, there is a formula, our integral has been defined, a point of 
convergence has been reached: the incenter of our triangle. 
- Phase 7: Implementing the agreement: This is the moment to define how, 
when and where will the agreements be implemented. This is the 
moment to draw the circumference that circumscribes our encounter 
point.  
 
Thus, on Sunday September 17, 1978, two agreements are reached: a 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East and a Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Both were 
signed by the three leaders -Anwar al-Sadat, Menachem Begin and 
Jimmy Carter- that same day at the official signing ceremony of the 
Camp David Accords in Washington.  
 
 At this point of our analysis, the pieces of the puzzle are already in place. 
We were able to move from a distributive structure to an integrative one, since an 
agreement has been reached, meeting our goals. But there is still one more step to 
go in our analysis process, because, as every ‘integral’, ours will also have a 
‘differential coefficient’; what will be ours? This is the question we will address 
next. 
 
THE KEY PIECE: THE AGREEMENT. LEVEL OF ACCOMMODATION  
 Our ‘differential coefficient’ will allow us understand the adjustment/agreement 
of the negotiation. Our question now should be what has been the ‘differential 
coefficient’ here, and why this coefficient -and only this one-  has made it possible to 
reach our goal, peace in the Middle East. Ultimately, the ‘differential’ is the crux of the 
matter, since it is what gives us the key to give a logical answer to the question posed in 
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the introduction: ‘Why were the agreements these, and not others?’ Then, let’s analyse 
the final documents of Camp David Accords: 
The Camp David Accords 
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East 
Preamble  
“The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:  
 The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and 
its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its 
parts. 
 After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle 
East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great 
religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East 
yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can 
be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for 
coexistence and cooperation among nations. 
 The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception 
accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the 
reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made 
by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples 
of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which 
must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the 
tragedies of war. 
 The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted 
norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for 
the conduct of relations among all states. 
 To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared 
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to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying 
out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338. 
 Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress 
toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation 
in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic 
development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security. 
 Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between 
nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace 
treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security 
arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early 
warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed 
measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are 
useful.”71 
 As we see here, the compromise to abide by UN SC RES 242 (1967) and UN SC 
RES 338 (1973) is to be reached only after previous settlement with each of the 
concerned States; a negotiation with every one of them is necessary, so that we can give 
a preliminary answer: after the first document, only one more document, focusing on 
Egypt, can be issued, for Egypt was the only represented party at the end of the 
negotiations. That is how the second Camp David document came - Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel-. Let’s find out what this 
document has to say about our initial question ‘Why were the agreements these, and not 
others?’: 
The Camp David Accords 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 
                                                          
71
 The Camp David Accords. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy 
Carter’s Presidency. 
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“It is agreed that:  
 The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or 
locations to be mutually agreed. 
 All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the 
dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
 Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented 
between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed. 
 The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally 
recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; 
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; 
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, 
and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible 
commercial use only by all nations; 
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and 
the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 
applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are 
international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and 
nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight; 
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat 
with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and 
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.”72 
 Now we do have all the keys: the presence of Egypt was necessary to create 
a working agreement in favour of achieving peace, but it was not sufficient to 
                                                          
72
 The Camp David Accords. Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/frame.phtml Authorized 
website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 
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reach such an agreement. Where is the key for ‘sufficiency’? It lies just in 
mentioning which were the territories belonging to Egypt before the’67 War, 
namely Sinai and Gaza. It is now when we are ready to ask the ‘big’ question: 
‘Why came the Sinai back to Egypt and not the other territories conquered during the 
’67 War? The answer is just a few lines behind: “1. the full exercise of Egyptian 
sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine.”73 At this point it seems that everything is solved and the puzzle has been 
perfectly assembled; but incisive minds may have yet another question: ‘Why does 
Egypt acknowledge the limits to its sovereignty at the border between itself and the 
Palestinian territories?’ This is just the meaning of Egypt acceding to ‘recover’ 
Sinai but not Gaza. The answer is to be found in al Quran, in a Surah which Begin 
mentioned to Sadat when he learned of his wish to visit Jerusalem (November 11, 
1977): 
 —“Your President said, two days ago, that he will be ready to come to 
Jerusalem, to our Parliament –the Knesset- in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier 
from being wounded. It is a good statement. I have already welcomed it, and it will be 
pleasure to welcome and receive your President with the traditional hospitality you 
and we have inherited from our common father, Abraham. And I, for my part, will, of 
course, be ready to come to your capital, Cairo, for the same purpose: No more wars –
peace- a real peace, and for ever. It is in the Holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to 
this Land was stated and sanctified. May I read to you this eternal Surah: 
 “Recall when Moses said to his people: Oh my people, remember the 
 goodness of Allah towards you when He appointed prophets amongst you.... 
 Oh my people, enter the Holy Land which Allah hath written down as 
 yours...”74 
                                                          
73
 Ibidem. 
74
 For wider information, here is the transcription of the complete text from al Quran that Begin quoted. I 
take the text in Spanish, preferring, because of its key role in the perception of our case, an accurate 
translation from the original text than risking a free translation to English or taking an unwarranted on 
line English version of the original Arabic. Surah 5, 22-28: “22. Cuando Moisés dijo a los israelitas: 
acordaos de los beneficios que habéis recibido de Dios; ha suscitado profetas en vuestro seno, os ha dado 
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 It is in this spirit of our common belief in God, in Divine Providence, in right 
and in justice, in all great human values which were handed down to you by the 
Prophet Mohammed and by our Prophets –Moses, Yeshayahu, Yermiyahu, Yehezkiel- 
it is in this human spirit that I say to you with all my heart: Shalom. It means 
Sulh.”—75 
 Now, to finish we shall round-up the question, in an almost rhetorical 
manner: ‘What is Begin’s basis?’ ‘What is the preexisting foundation that will 
validate his words?’ “It was on that occasion that the Lord made a covenant with 
Abraham, saying: To your descendants I give this land, from the Wadi of Egypt to the 
Great River [Euphrates]” (Gn. 15, 18)76 
                                                                                                                                                                          
reyes, os ha concedido favores que no ha concedido jamás a nación ninguna. 23. Entra, ¡oh pueblo mío!, 
en la tierra santa que Dios te ha destinado; no volváis atrás por temor a que os encaminéis a vuestra 
perdición. 24. Este país, respondieron los israelitas, está habitado por hombres poderosos. Mientras lo 
ocupen, nosotros no entraremos en él. Si salen, nosotros tomaremos posesión de él. 25. Presentaos a la 
puerta de la villa, dijeron los hombres que temían al Señor y que estaban favorecidos por sus gracias: no 
bien hayáis entrado, seréis vencedores. Poned vuestra confianza en Dios, si sois fieles. 26. ¡Oh Moisés!, 
dijo el pueblo, no entraremos mientras no haya salido el pueblo que la habita. Ve con tu Dios y combatid 
ambos. Nosotros permaneceremos aquí. 27. Señor, exclamó Moisés, solo tengo poder sobre mí y sobre mi 
hermano; pronuncia sobre nosotros y este pueblo de impíos. 28. Entonces el Señor dijo: Esta tierra les 
estará prohibida durante cuarenta años. Andarán errantes por el desierto, y tú cesa de atormentarte a causa 
de este pueblo de impíos”. Moiffat Al-Kharat, El Corán. Arganda del Rey (Madrid), Editorial EDIMAT 
Libros, S. A., 2007, p.83-84. 
75
 Document 5:  President Sadat's plan to visit Israel solicited this speech by Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin (November 11, 1977), who had succeeded Prime Minister Rabin after a surprise 
election victory. In: The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents 
After Twenty-Five Years”. Source on line: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents.phtml Authorized 
website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 
76
 USCCB, The New American Bible. Translated by Members of the Catholic Biblical Association of 
America. Encino (California), Benziger Editor, 1970, p. 21. 
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77
  
78
 
 As it has been shown, our level of accommodation -the ‘differential’ in our 
‘integral’- has been reduced to an explanation/quantification as a one-variable 
function, culture, and specifically religion, the deepest and most radical component 
of culture. ‘So, is it that, in the beginning of the XXI century, religion still has 
something to teach us?’ It may not be to believe in its ‘object’, God, but to believe 
in its ‘subject’, religion itself, for there are still today human beings and peoples 
that live in observance of its laws. 
 
                                                          
77
 Source on line: http://www.bible.ca/archeology/bible-archeology-exodus-kadesh-barnea-southern-
border-judah-territory-river-of-egypt-wadi-el-arish-tharu-rhinocolu.htm  Website of biblical archaeology 
and geography. 
78
 Argument on the importance of the Biblical allotment of land to this negotiation has been verified in an 
anonymous meeting with Mr. X (high representative of the Jewish religious community in Belgium) on 
December 13, 2010.  
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CONCLUSION: THE LOGIC OF THE PAST, A LESSON FOR THE FUTURE 
 Once our case, the First Camp David, has been fully analysed, only one 
question remains: ‘Is the effort of this minute analysis a contribution, or is it just an 
intellectual ‘divertimento’?’ To answer this question we have to go back to the 
reflection on history that was done in the introduction, where the argument was 
that the only possibility to go on building History is through a profound 
understanding of the reasons leading to a certain agreement, but not to a different 
one, in the course of an international negotiation –after all, History is just the 
history of the disagreements and agreements attained by mankind throughout the 
ages-. 
 Thus, the humble contribution of this investigation will be to highlight the 
role of culture, from the angle of beliefs -not only religious but of the type ‘I believe 
X, and not Y’ of each negotiator. Culture, the paramount transmitter of beliefs, forms 
us in an unyielding manner. Let’s look again at the definition of culture in the New 
Encyclopædia Britannica: “Culture, the integrate pattern of human Knowledge, 
belief and behaviour. Culture thus defined consists of language, ideas, beliefs, customs, 
taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies and other 
related components; and the development of culture depends upon man’s capacity to 
learn and to transmit knowledge to succeeding generations. (1990, Vol.3, p. 784)”79 
Nevertheless, to say that the culture/beliefs present in an international negotiation 
is the cornerstone to prepare and resolve it reaching a plausible and possible 
agreement, is to recognize that negotiation is a science in itself, as it requires us to 
accurately study all the pieces involved, as we have seen along this work, but it is 
also an art, demanding of a ‘savoir faire’ that is not related to deduction from 
tangible knowledge, but to abduction from inductive knowledge. As R. Lewicki, 
Bruce Barry and David Saunders say: “The notion that negotiation is both art and 
science is especially valid at the cross-cultural or international level. The science of 
                                                          
79
 Quoted by Winfried Lang, “A Professional’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of 
Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 38. 
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negotiation provides research evidence to support broads trends that often, but not 
always, occur during the negotiation. The art of negotiation is deciding which 
strategy to apply when and choosing which models and perspectives to apply to 
increase cross-.cultural understanding. This is especially challenging because cross-
cultural and international negotiations add a level of complexity significantly greater 
tan within-culture negotiations.”80 
 
 A deep knowledge of the cultures present in a negotiation is a big vantage 
point to accomplish it, because its success or its failure are not to obtain what was 
initially desired -or not-, but to obtain –or not- the best result that the pieces in this 
particular game can provide. Aiming at what these pieces can provide, and not at 
our desires, is more realistic and scientific, and also less frustrating; it is necessary 
not to dismiss a single one of the variables involved in the game, including the least 
visible –but more present- one, culture/beliefs; this is the decisive variable, and, as 
sugar in the coffee, you don’t see it, but it is there. 
 
 In this same sense, the main thing of this work is not precisely whether or 
not it reached the desired purpose, but whether the reflections presented open the 
way to future thinking, open the gates to future history. The ultimate purpose of 
this paper is to open a door to the scrutiny of those minds which are passionate 
about negotiation. Our last question, dedicated to all those who read this far, is: 
  
AND YOU, what do you think-believe?? 
 
 
 
                                                          
80
 R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 443. 
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